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Law, Race, and the Epistemology of Ignorance
GEORGE A. MARTiNEZ*
Abstract
Philosophers and other theorists have developed the field of
epistemology which is the study of human knowledge. Criticalrace theorists
have begun to explore how epistemological theory and insights may
illuminate the study of race, including the analysis of race and the law. Such
use of epistemology is appropriatebecause theoretical work on knowledge
can be used to advance one of the key goals of critical race theory which is
to understand how a regime of white supremacy and its subordination of
people of color have been created and maintainedin America. In this regard,
philosophers and other theorists have recently begun to develop an
"epistemology of ignorance" which is an examination of the complex
phenomenon of ignorancethat seeks to describe differentforms of ignorance,
examining how they are produced and sustained,and what role they play in
knowledge practices. In particular, theorists have begun to apply an
epistemology of ignorance to issues of race, racism and white privilege and
are exploring how.forms of ignorance operate in enabling racialoppression
or domination.Legal scholars have begun to use some of the insights of the
epistemology of ignorance in analyzing certain aspects of law and the legal
profession. No one, however, has sought to examine the epistemology of
ignorance at work in the area of race and law in as comprehensive a fashion
as this article. This comprehensive treatment makes it possible to reveal the
magnitude of the negative impact of the production of ignorance in the legal
context on various racialminority groups. Accordingly, this article seeks to
explore the epistemology of ignorance at work in the context of law and race
and reveal how the production of ignorance has helped enable the dominant
group to subordinate racialminorities in America

* Professor of Law, Dedman School of Law at Southern Methodist University, B.A. Arizona
State University; M.A. (Philosophy) University of Michigan; J.D. Harvard University.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Philosophers and other theorists have developed the field of
"epistemology" which is "the study of human knowledge."' Critical race
theorists have begun to explore how epistemological theory and insights may
illuminate the study of race, including the analysis of race and the law. 2 Such
use of epistemology is appropriate because theoretical work on knowledge
can be used to advance one of the key goals of critical race theory which is
"to understand how a regime of white supremacy and its subordination of
people of color have been created and maintained in America[.]",3 In this
regard, philosophers and other theorists have recently begun to develop an
"epistemology of ignorance" which "is an examination of the complex
phenomenon of ignorance" that seeks to describe "different forms of
ignorance, examining how they are produced and sustained, and what role
1. ROBERT C. SOLOMON, INTRODUCING PHILOSOPHY: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 95

(2d ed. 1981).
2. See, e.g., George A. Martinez, Arizona, Immigration, and Latinos: The Epistemology
of Whiteness, the Geography ofRace Interest Convergence and the View from the Perspective
of CriticalTheory, 44 Az. ST. L.J. 175 (2012).
3.

KIMBERLE CRENSHAW ET. AL., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT

FORMED THE MOVEMENT XIII (1995).
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they play in knowledge practices." '4 In particular, theorists have begun to
apply "an epistemology of ignorance to issues of race, racism, and white
privilege" and are exploring how forms of ignorance operate in enabling
racial oppression or domination. 5 Legal scholars have begun to use some of
the insights of the epistemology of ignorance in analyzing certain aspects of
law and the legal profession. 6 No one, however, has sought to examine the
epistemology of ignorance at work in the area of race and law in as
comprehensive a fashion as this article. This comprehensive treatment makes
it possible to reveal the magnitude of the negative impact of the production
of ignorance in the legal context on vanious racial minority groups.
Accordingly, this article seeks to explore the epistemology of ignorance at
work in the context of law and race and reveal how the production of
ignorance has helped enable the dominant group to subordinate racial
minorities in America.
In Part II, the Article explains the leading ideas behind the epistemology
of ignorance, which requires whites to misinterpret and misrepresent matters
dealing with race in order to maintain their position as the dominant group.
In Parts III-VIII, the Article sets out-through a series of important
examples-how the dominant group has constructed an epistemology of
ignorance in the area of race and law. In particular, Sections Ill-VIII contend
that the dominant group has constructed an epistemology of ignorance (1) in
the area of law with respect to Native Americans; (2) in the area of law with
respect to Mexican-Americans; (3) in the area of employment law; (4) in the
area of immigration law and policy in the Trump era, including the Muslim
Travel Ban Case and in the matter of child separation at the border; (5) in the
area of Federalism in recent United States Supreme Court cases dealing with
Medicaid expansion and voting rights; and (6) in the areas of legal
scholarship and in the outlawing of ethnic studies in Arizona. The Article
argues that this production of ignorance has helped whites maintain their
socially dominant position in the United States.

4.

Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana, Introduction, in RACE & EPISTEMOLOGIES OF

IGNORANCE 1 (Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana eds., 2007).
5. Id.
6. April Shaw, How Race-Selective and Sex-Selective Bans on Abortion Expose the
Color-Coded Dimensions of the Right to Abortion and Deficiencies in Constitutional
Protectionsfor Women of Color, 40 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 545, 572 (2016) (using

the epistemology of ignorance in analyzing women's right to an abortion); Dermot Feenan,
UnderstandingDisadvantagePartlythrough an Epistemology of Ignorance, 16 SOC. & LEGAL

STUD. 509 (2007) (employing the epistemology of ignorance in studying the appointment of
women judges).
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II. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF IGNORANCE
Epistemologists of race have recognized that socially dominant groups
do not necessarily have a privileged access to knowledge about the social
world.7 As philosopher Charles Mills has explained: "[H]egemonic groups
characteristically have experiences that foster illusory perceptions about
society's functioning whereas subordinate groups characteristically have
experiences that (at least potentially) give rise to more adequate
conceptualizations."8
In this regard and in the context of race, Charles Mills theorizes that
there is a "Racial Contract" that governs race relations in society. 9 This
Racial Contract contains an epistemological provision which constitutes an

agreement "about what counts as a correct, objective interpretation of the
world... for agreeing to this view, one is ('contractually') granted full

cognitive standing in the polity, the official epistemic community."' 0 This
"Racial Contract require[s] that whites engage in a significant degree of
misunderstanding, misinterpretation and misrepresentation on matters related
to race."" As a result, Mills contends that "[t]he Racial Contract prescribes
for its signatories an inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a
particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are
psychologically and socially functional), producing the ironic outcome that
whites will in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have
7. Rebecca Mason, Two Kinds of Unknowing, 26 HYPATIA 294-307, 301 (2011). "That
is to say, although membership in a socially powerful group affords certain benefits, privileged
social perception is not necessarily among them. Although epistemic access is differentiated
according to social location, powerful groups do not ipsofacto get a better view." Id.
8.

CHARLES MILLS, BLACKNESS VISIBLE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND RACE 28 (1998).

Charles Mills has been a pioneer in analyzing the ways in which racial oppression is connected
"to our conceptions and productions of knowledge." Sullivan & Tuana, supra note 4, at 2.
9. See CHARLES MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT (Cornell University Press, 1997). See
also Mason, supra note 7, at 301-02. "Mills introduces the notion of the 'Racial Contract' as
a way to challenge the assumptions of white political philosophy ... Mills's framework is
conducive to discussions of race and white racism that structure society as we think we know
it. Thus instead of focusing on a forward-looking, ideal contract that purports to describe the
structure of a perfectly just society in which we would like to live, Mills focuses on a historical,
non-ideal contract that describes the origin and nature of the unjust society in which we
currently live." Id.
10. MILLS, supra note 9, at 18.

11. Mason, supra note 7, at 302. See also Alison Bailey, Strategic Ignorance, in RACE
& EPISTEMOLOGIES OF IGNORANCE, supra note 4, at 77, 80.

"Implicit agreement to

misrepresent the world is coupled with constant pressure to accept these counterfeit images as
real currency ... This steady parade of misrepresentations generates a racialized moral
psychology in which white perception and conception, memory, experience and testimony are
shaped by a willful and habitual inversion of reality." Id. See also Linda Martin Alcoff,
Epistemologiesof Ignorance: Three Types, in RACE & EPISTEMOLOGIES OF IGNORANCE, supra
note 4, at 39, 40. "[O]ppressive systems produce ignorance as one of their effects." Id.
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made."' 2 This "white ignorance" "is the product of an epistemic agreement
among whites to see the world wrongly-that is, to cultivate and sustain a
system of false beliefs.' 13 Such ignorance enables whites to maintain their
socially dominant position with respect to racial minorities. 14 Indeed, white
ignorance is "linked with white supremacy," it "distorts reality," and
"supports a delusion of white racial superiority. ,15
Epistemologists of race seek to bring to light and uncover:
[W]hat Mills has called a "racial fantasyland" that undergirds
white dominance and privilege. This fantasyland constitutes the
epistemology of ignorance that prevents whites from perceiving
the reality and effects of their own beliefs concerning racial
difference.
Such cognitive blindness requires fundamental
revision, for it rests on what Mills calls a "consensual
hallucination," an invented delusional world where white moral
consciousness is filtered by norms of social cognition that derive
from an unconscious sense of dominance in the world. 16
12. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 9, at 18. See also Sullivan & Tuana,
supra note 4, at 2. "For Mills, the epistemology of ignorance is part of a white supremacist
state in which the human race is racially divided into full persons and subpersons. Even
though-or, more accurately, precisely because-they tend not to understand the racist world
in which they live, white people are able to fully benefit from its racial hierarchies, ontologies,
and economies." Id.
13. Mason, supra note 7, at 302. See also Charles Mills, White Ignorance, in RACE &
EPISTEMOLOGIES OF IGNORANCE, supra note 4, at 11, 16. Mills uses "ignoranceto cover both
false belief and the absence of true belief." Id.
14 Mason, supra note 7, at 302. See also Martin Alcoff, supra note 11, at 48. Alcoff
interprets Mills's argument as follows:
1. One of the key features of oppressive societies is that they do not acknowledge
themselves as oppressive. Therefore, in any given oppressive society, there is a
dominant view about the general nature of society that represents its particular forms
of inequality and exploitation as basically just and fair, or at least the best of all
possible worlds.
2. It is very likely, however, that the dominant representation of the unjust society as a
just society will have countervailing evidence on a daily basis that is at least
potentially visible to everyone in the society.
3. Therefore, cognitive forms of assessment will have to be maintained that allow for
this countervailing evidence to be regularly dismissed so that the dominant view can
be held stable.
15. Sullivan & Tuana, supra note 4, at 3.
16. Dan Flory, The Epistemology of Race and Black American Film Noir: Spike Lee's
Summer of Sam as Lynching Parable,reprintedin SPIKE LEE READER 196,201 (Paula Massood
ed., 2008). See also Martin Alcoff, supra note 11, at 49. "Mills suggests that 'whiteness,'
which he carefully defines as a political construct rather than simply an ethnic category, brings
with it a 'cognitive model that precludes self-transparency and genuine understanding of all
social realities,' that it ensures that whites will live in a 'racial fantasyland, [or] a consensual
hallucination,' and that the root of all this is the 'cognitive and moral economy psychically
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In this paper, I seek to reveal the epistemology of ignorance or "racial
fantasyland" at work in the area of law.
III.

LAW, THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF IGNORANCE AND
NATIVE AMERICANS

The dominant group has constructed an epistemology of ignorance with
respect to Native
Americans. The dominant group has engaged in "misunderstanding,
misinterpretation and misrepresentation" on matters related to Native
Americans and the law. They have created a racial fantasyland with respect
to Native Americans which has helped the dominant group to maintain their
socially dominant position just as predicted by theorists of the epistemology
of ignorance.
With respect to Native Americans, a key way the epistemology of
ignorance has been constructed has been for the courts to misdescribe and
misrepresent Native Americans as warlike savages. 17 For example, in an
1835 case, State v. Foreman,i" the Tennessee Supreme Court described and
justified the White European settlement of the United States as follows:
[T]he principle by which the country was taken possession of,
was the only rule of action possible to be observed . . .it was

more just the country should be peopled by Europeans, than
continue the haunt of savage beasts, and of men yet more fierce
and savage, who, 'if they might not be extirpated for their want
of religion and just morals, they might be reclaimed for their
errors' . . . [a] rule of which savages of the description have no

just right to complain. 19
The Court also observed that the Native Americans of the "immense
required for conquest, colonization, and enslavement."' Id.
17. See Ann E. Tweedy, "HostileIndian Tribes... Outlaws, ...Wolves ....Bears...
Grizzlies and Things Like That? " How the SecondAmendment andSupreme CourtPrecedent
Target TribalSelf-Defense, 13 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 687, 709-23, 710 (2011). "Nonetheless,

the notion of Indians as warlike savages, which was based in large part on the historical myth
of the savage war, survived and lives on even now in the collective memory and in case law
defining Indians as such and using their alleged savagery to justify deprivations of tribes'
sovereign rights." Id.; WALTER R. ECHO-HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR: THE TEN
WORST INDIAN LAW CASES EVER DECIDED 41 (2010). "Thus, in the important cases defining

Native American Rights, the decisions branded Indians as savages-that is, brutish people
who lack attributes normal to civilized human beings-and treated them accordingly." Id.;
Mills, White Ignorance,supra note 13, at 11, 26-27.
18. 16 Tenn. 256 (1835).
19. Foreman, 16 Tenn. at 265; Tweedy, supra note 17, at 712-13.
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west and northwest" were "[t]ribes that subsist on raw flesh, and are savage
as the most savage beasts that infest that mighty wilderness. 2 o Similarly, the
highest territorial court of Idaho observed in 1874 that "the whole country"
was "inhabited by wild and barbarous savages.",2 1 Likewise, the Nevada high
court opined in 1883 that "[i]n 1861, the Indians here were savages in name
and fact" and that they "killed inoffensive white men., 22 Indeed, the early
American "case law monolithically portrays the tribes, many of whom were
presumably fighting to retain their lands, as savage aggressors. '"23
The use of such language misdescribing and misrepresenting Native
Americans as savages, implicating the epistemology of ignorance, enabled
the dominant group to subordinate Native Americans. For instance, during
the so-called "heroic age of the Supreme Court," Native Americans "lost
more times than not, at a ratio in fact of 2 to 1" at a time "when the greatest
chief justice of all time talked about them [as savages in] this way. 24 Even
after the 1954 landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v.
Boardof Education,25 overturning legally compelled segregation of AfricanAmericans, the Supreme Court continued to misdescribe and misrepresent
Native Americans "as culturally and racially inferior wandering ignorant
savages [.]' 26 For instance, in Tee-Hit Ton v. UnitedStates,27 a case decided
one year after Brown, the Supreme Court stated:
Every American school boy knows that the savage tribes of this
continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that
even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return
for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the
conquerors' will that deprived them of their land.28
In Tee-Hit-Ton, "the Court uses the language of savagery" to support its

20. Id. at 713.

21. Pickett v. United States, 1 Idaho 523, 530 (1874); Tweedy, supra note 17, at 714.
22. State ex rel. Trumanv. McKenney, 2 P. 171, 179 (1883); Tweedy, supra note 17, at
714.
23. Id.
24. ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN
RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA xviii (2005). See also ECHO-HAWK,

supra note 17, at 5 (describing a movement among "legal scholars who present a powerful
case for decolonizing federal Indian law and confronting the Supreme Court about its
continued use of legal precedent tainted with racism ... [who question whether] legal
advocates [can] expect to win lawsuits by citing cases that call Native Americans 'savages'
and by relying upon legal principles founded on the racial inferiority of their clients").
25. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26. WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at xxi.
27. 348 U.S. 272, 289-90 (1955).

28. 348 U.S. at 289-90.
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holding "that the Tee-Hit-Ton tribe was not entitled to Fifth Amendment
compensation" because the "tribes generally have lost their lands to the
United States through conquest rather than arms-length transactions. 29
Similarly, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 30 a decision handed
down in 1978, the Supreme Court held that "an Indian Tribe lacks criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians committing crimes on its reservation," and
therefore Indian courts had no power to judge white Americans. 3 1 In
justifying its conclusion that the rights of Native Americans are inferior to
those of whites, the Oliphant court relied on an 1891 case, In re Mayfield,32
and "its blatantly racist nineteenth-century judicial language of Indian
savagery and white supremacy ' 33 and explained:
In In re Mayfield, the court noted that the policy of Congress had
been to allow the inhabitants of the Indian Country 'such power
of self-government as was thought to be consistent with the safety
of the white population with which they may come in contact, and
to encourage them as far as possible in raising themselves to our
standard of civilization. 34
This misdescription and misrepresentation of Native Americans as
savages has enabled the dominant group to maintain its socially dominant

position. As Robert Williams has explained: "The racist precedents and
language of Indian savagery used and relied upon by the justices throughout

this ongoing historical period of legalized racial dictatorship have most often
worked... to justify the denial to Indians of important rights of property,
self-government, and cultural survival.

29. Tweedy, supra note 17, at 721.
30. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
31. WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at xxiii. See also ECHO-HAWK, supra note 17, at 21. In

Oliphant, "the Court refused to let tribal courts try whites for crimes committed on Indian
reservations. Even though tribal courts are as sophisticated as any other court, Justice
Rehnquist's opinion severely restricted their reach. Tribal courts are not really a part of the
American judicial system, because tribes lost their sovereignty and gave up 'their power to try
non-Indian citizens.' Under the colonial structure, only the courts of the conqueror may judge
a white man and tribal government tribunals cannot sit in judgment of white citizens." Id.
32.

141 U.S. 107 (1891).

24 at xxiii.
34. Oliphant,435 U.S. at 204.
35. WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at xxv. See also Tweedy, supra note 17, at 739. "These
33.

WILLIAMS, supra note

precedents denied tribes sovereign rights based in large part on the implicit justification of
Indian savagery. When these precedents are relied upon now, they are expanded... tojustify
even greater incursions upon tribal sovereignty." Id.; ECHO-HAWK, supra note 17, at 41.
"Many cases affecting Native Americans have produced stark injustices ....Those cases
usually describe Indians as 'inferior,' 'ignorant,' 'savages,' heathens,' or 'uncivilized'." Id.
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LAW, THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF IGNORANCE AND
MEXICAN-AMERICANS

The dominant group also has engaged in the epistemology of ignorance
regarding Mexican-Americans. They have misunderstood, misinterpreted,
and misrepresented various issues regarding Mexican-Americans and the
law. This construction of a racial fantasyland with respect to MexicanAmeicans has also helped the dominant group to maintain a socially
dominant position in American society.
For example, one of the ways Mexican-Americans were misinterpreted
to their disadvantage was to misconstruct the racial identity 36 of MexicanAmenicans as white for purposes of determining whether they were
37
adequately represented on juries in criminal trials. In Hernandezv. Texas,
an all-white jury convicted a Mexican-American man, Pete Hemandez, of
murder. 38 He sought to reverse his conviction on appeal on the ground that
Mexican-Americans had been excluded from the jury. 39 He supported his
argument by citing cases that had held that excluding African-Amenicans
36. "Today the very idea of a racial identity trial may seem bizarre. Trials involving
racial identity, however, were common occurrences in local American courts from their
beginnings in the late eighteenth century well into the twentieth century, encompassing people
of European, African, Asian, Mexican, and Native American ancestry from the deep South to
the industrial North to the far West." ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON'T TELL: AHISTORY
OF RACE ON TRIAL IN AMERICA 3 (2008).

37. 251 S.W. 2d 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952). For more on Hernandez, see "COLORED
MEN" AND "HOMBRES AQUL": HERNANDEZ V. TEXAS AND THE EMERGENCE OF MEXICAN-

AMERICAN LAWYERING (Michael A. Olivas ed., 2006); Ian Haney Lopez & Michael A. Olivas,

Jim Crow, Mexican-Americans and the Anti-Subordination Constitution: The Story of
Hernandez v. Texas, in RACE LAW STORIES 273 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds.,
2008); Kevin R. Johnson, Hernandez v. Texas. Legacies ofJustice andInjustice, 25 CHICANOLATINO L. REV. 153 (2005); Steven H. Wilson, Brown over "Other White": Mexican
Americans' Legal Arguments and Litigation Strategy in School DesegregationLawsuits, 21
LAW&HIST. REV. 145 (2003).

38. See Haney Lopez & Olivas, supra note 37, at 280-81. "Between October 8 and 11,
1951, Hernandez was tried by an all-white jury" and "on October 11, 1951," he was found
guilty of murder and sentenced to life in prison. Id.
39. See Haney Lopez & Olivas, supra note 37, at 276. "The central legal claim in
Hernandez was whether Mexican Americans were entitled to a 'jury of their peers' that
included other Mexican-Americans." Id. "To the extent it was important to litigate the racial
exclusivity of the jury system in Texas, the facts of Hernandez were perfect: In a county more
than 14% Mexican-American, there had been no Hispanic jurors in over a quarter century."
Id. at 284. See also Wilson, supra note 37, at 161. "To support their contention that the
exclusion of Mexican-Americans from the juries must have been deliberate, Cadena and
Garcia obtained a stipulation from the state and county attorneys that there were males of
'Mexican or Latin American' descent in Jackson County who were eligible to serve as
members of either a commission or a jury. The state and county attorneys also agreed to
stipulate that, at least during the previous twenty-five years, no one with a Spanish surname
had served on ajury commission, grand jury, or petit jury in Jackson County." Id.
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from juries violated the constitution's guarantee of due process and equal
protection and contended that the exclusion of Mexican-Americans should
similarly amount to a constitutional violation. 40 The court responded to the
argument by observing that the Fourteenth Amendment protects only two
groups of people: blacks and whites. The court held that MexicanAmenicans were white persons for purposes of the equal protection and due
process clauses. 4 1 Moreover, since the juries that had indicted and convicted
the defendant were comprised of white people, there was no equal protection
42
violation.

In Hernandez, then, Mexican-Americans were misrepresented or
misconstrued as white and were unable to assert a distinctive non-white
identity which might have offered more protection on the jury. As a result of
this misrepresentation, the Fourteenth Amendment provided no protection
for Mexican-Americans and the dominant group was able to exclude them
from juries.
The Hernandezcase is consistent with earlier Court of Criminal Appeals
of Texas decisions holding that Mexican-Americans were white for purposes
of jury selection. For example, in Sanchez v. State,43 the defendant Anecito
Sanchez was convicted of murder and was sentenced to ten years in prison.
On appeal, Sanchez argued that he had been convicted in "violation of the
due process clause in that there was a continual and uninterrupted practice in
Fort Bend County of discriminating against Mexican-Americans as a race...
in the selection of grand jury commissioners and grand jurors. ' 44 The Court
held that there was no constitutional violation because Mexican-Americans
.are not a separate race but are white people of Spanish descent, as has often
been said by this court., 45 Accordingly, the Court stated that "[w]e find no
ground for discussing the question further and the complaint raised by this
"

40. See Wilson, supra note 37, at 162. "When they presented the case before the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals, Cadena and Garcia sought to appropriate a 'nile of exclusion' that
the U.S. Supreme Court had announced in Norris v. Alabama (1935). Alabama's State
Supreme Court had let stand the conviction of Clarence Norris-one of nine black's
'Scottsboro Boys' who had been convicted of the rape of two white women-despite the
exclusion of African-Americans from both the grand and petitjuries. The U.S. Supreme Court
had reversed, ruling that state action, whether by the legislative court or executive, to exclude
from jury service 'all persons of the African race, solely because of their race or color' when
the same were both available and qualified to serve, had denied 'a person of the African race'
the equal protection of the laws and was contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. Cadena and
Garcia sought to persuade the Texas court to apply this reasoning to Mexican Americans." Id
41. Hernandez, 251 S.W.2d at 536.
42. Id.
43. 156 Tex. Crim. 468 (1951).
44. 156 Tex. Crim. at 469.

45. 156 Tex. Crim. at 469. See also Johnson, supra note 37, at 172 (observing that
historically "Mexican American litigants found it difficult to prevail in cases seeking to
vindicate their civil rights because of the law's classification of Mexicans as white").
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bill will not be sustained."46
That this was a misconstrual of the race of Mexican-Americans is
revealed in affidavits collected by Alonso Perales, a pioneering civil rights
attorney, during roughly the same time period as the Hernandez and Sanchez
cases which show that Mexican-Americans were not treated or viewed as
white in every day encounters.4 7 For instance, a Mexican-American named
Ernesto Perez stated in his sworn affidavit that on June 21, 1943, he was told
by an usher at a movie theater in Hondo, Texas, that he not allowed to sit in
the center or middle section of the theater because it "was for white people
only" and that another part of the theater "was reserved for Mexicans.,, 48
Perez informed the usher that "[Perez] was classified as white by the United
States Government in Washington.... ,49 Perez then appealed to the
manager
of the theatre who told Perez that "No, you are not white; you are a
• ,,50
Mexican.
Similarly, Jesus Valdez stated in a sworn affidavit, dated June
26, 1941, that he did construction work at a location where "drinking pails"
were designated "as follows: 'For Whites;' 'For Mexicans;' and 'For
Negroes. '-51 When Valdez took a drink of water out of a pail marked "For
Whites," the foreman terminated his employment "because [Valdez] had
drunk water out of the pail marked 'For Whites."' In defense, Valdez told
the foreman that:
I considered myself as white as he or any other person. [The
foreman] then said substantially the following:
"You are
discharged, and any other person of Mexican or African descent
who drinks water out of the pails marked "For Whites" will be
discharged also. 2
Similarly, a "1950 survey" of white Texans published in a leading Texas

46. 156 Tex. Crim. at 469. See also GROSS, supra note 36, at 282. "Inits Sanchez ruling

the Court of Criminal Appeals berated the two lawyers for their 'exhaustive brief' . . . citing
cases which, either intentionally or loosely refer to Mexican people as a different race." Id.
47. For more on Alonso Perales, see IN DEFENSE OF MY PEOPLE: ALONSO S. PERALES
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEXICAN-AMERICAN PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS

(Michael A. Olivas,

ed., 2012).
48. ALONSO S. PERALES, ARE WE GOOD NEIGHBORS? 194 (1974).
49. PERALES, supranote 48, at 194.
50. PERALES, supranote 48, at 194.
51. PERALES, supranote 48, at 211.
52. PERALES, supra note 48, at 211. See also DAVID MONTEJANO, ANGLOS AND
MEXICANS IN THE MAKING OF TEXAS, 1836-1986 265 (1987). "The 'Latin American' and black

workers were not permitted to use the drinking fountains or the toilets and bathing facilities
provided for Anglos. Nor were they permitted to punch the same time clock or receive their
pay through the same window used by Anglos." Id.
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newspaper showed that such whites "viewed Mexicans as a different race. ",53
The survey reported that Anglo Texans "make no effort to cover up their
prejudices against Latin-Americans" and feared "race mixing" with
Mexicans. 54
As predicted by the epistemology of ignorance, the misconstrual of
Mexican-Americans as white enabled whites to maintain their dominant
position in society. The dominant group was able to exclude MexicanAmericans from juries and thereby subordinate Mexican-Americans through
unjust or unfair jury convictions and by protecting whites in jury trials from
Mexican-Americans attempting to assert their rights. 5 Indeed, as Professors
Haney Lopez and Olivas have explained:
[i]n the context of Texas race politics ... to put Mexican
Americans on juries was tantamount to elevating such persons to
equal status with whites. The idea that 'Mexicans' might judge
whites deeply violated Texas's racial caste system-and placing
Mexican-Americans on juries became critical to the caste
system's demise .... [and putting an end to] a key pillar of Jim
Crow: the belief that whites should judge all but be judged by
56
none but themselves.
Beyond the exclusion from juries, in the not-too-distant past, MexicanAmenicans along with other racial minorities faced a general Jim Crow form
of oppression and were therefore segregated and excluded from taking part
in dominant white or Anglo society. 57 Indeed, as Richard Valencia has
53. GRoss, supranote 36, at 269.
54. GRoss, supra note 36, at 269.
55. See Haney Lopez & Olivas, supra note 37, at 284. "To be sure, all-white juries
imperiled Mexican-American defendants who, like Hernandez himself, risked hostile and
biased convictions. Moreover, the Mexican-American community suffered because white
juries rarely and reluctantly convicted whites for depredations against Mexican-Americans."
Id.; Johnson, supranote 37, at 182-83. "Latina/o underrepresentation onjuries canbe expected
to have substantive impacts. In the 1960s, Chicano activist attorney Oscar "Zeta" Acosta
challenged the grand jury system in Los Angeles County by defending Chicana/o political
activists charged with criminal offenses just as the League of United Latin American Citizens
did on behalf of Pete Hernandez and Mexican Americans in Hernandezv. Texas. The unstated
hope was that the inclusion of Latina/os on grand juries would affect the outcome of cases. At
a minimum, the parties sought a more impartial jury that would not hold Mexican ancestry
against Mexican defendants." Id.
56. Haney Lopez & Olivas, supra note 37, at 284. See also Johnson, supra note 37, at
182. "As Hernandez v. Texas exemplifies, discrimination in the selection of petit and grand
juries has long plagued Mexican-Americans in the United States. Exclusion of Latina/os from
jury service historically has denoted the subordinated status of Latina/os in American social
life." Id.
57.

See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 110 (3d ed. 1992). "[N]o
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observed:
As a colonized people, Mexican Americans faced segregation in,
or exclusion from, for example, movie theatres, restaurants, and
public accommodations (e.g., swimming pools) .... For many
Mexican Americans, segregation spanned from the 'cradle to the
grave.' There was forced segregation in maternity wards and
separate cemetaries for whites and Mexican Americans .... The
treatment of Mexican Americans as nonpeers allowed whites to
maintain their system of privilege and domination.58
Such segregation was so all encompassing and oppressive that it seemed
to create separate worlds for Mexican-Americans and whites. David
Montejano explains:
On the social plane, the rules of etiquette served to acknowledge
Anglo superiority before the Mexican. Mexicans were expected,
according to a historical account of a Winter Garden county to
have a 'deferential posture and respectful voice tone' whenever in
the presence of Anglos. All contact between American and
Mexican followed rather explicit rules. Movie houses, drugstores,
restaurants, retail stores, banks, schools, and so on-the
institutions of 'modernity'-had brought with them definitions of
the 'proper place' of Mexicans. Public buildings were seen as
'Anglo territories,' Mexican women were 'only supposed to shop
on the Anglo side of town on Saturdays, preferably during the
early hours when Anglos were not shopping': Mexicans were
allowed only counter and carry-out service at Anglo cafes and all
Mexicans were expected to be back in Mexican town by sunset.
So completely segregated were the two towns that, in effect, 'there
was an Anglo world and a Mexicano
world' whose main point of
59
contact was the 'dusty fields.

detail was too small in the frantic effort to seal off contact between blacks and whites... The
law had created two worlds so separate that communication between them was almost
impossible." Id.; MONTEJANO, supra note 52, at 160. "The modern order framed MexicanAnglo relations in stark 'Jim Crow' segregation. Separate quarters for Mexican and Anglo
were to be found in the farm towns. Specific rules defined the proper place of Mexicans and
regulated interracial contact. The separation was so complete and seemingly absolute that
several observers have described the farm society as 'castelike'." Id.
58. RICHARD R. VALENCIA, CHICANO STUDENTS AND THE COURTS: THE MEXICAN
AMERICAN LEGAL STRUGGLE FOR EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY 7 (2008).

59. MONTEJANO, supra note 52, at 168.
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One of the most damaging aspects of this system of Jim Crow was the
segregation of Mexican-American children in the public schools.60 Such
segregation clearly revealed the:
Intent of [white] farm settlers to build separate institutions for the
races....
The farm settlers understood well the potentially
corrosive force of 'educating Mexicans' for the maintenance of
their divided world. The divisions of the racial order made little
sense if Mexicans were better educated than some Anglos or if
both were 'mixed' in schools. Educating the Mexican also61raised
the danger that Mexicans might seek 'social equality'....
Mexican-Americans challenged such school segregation in the courts.62
These cases implicate the epistemology of ignorance. For example, the court
misconstrued reality in an historic Texas desegregation case. In Independent
School Dist. v. Salvatierra,3 Mexican-American plaintiffs challenged the
segregation of Mexican-American children in the public schools in Del Rio,
Texas. The League of United Latin American citizens (LULAC) 64 initiated
this law suit "as a test case intended to bring an end to segregation in
Texas. 65 The school district was segregating Mexican-American children in
60. See GROSS, supra note 36, at 267. "In Texas in the 1930s and 1940s, as in much of

the Southwest and California, most Mexican American children attended separate schools;
indeed by 1930, 90 percent of all south Texas schools were segregated." Id.
61. MONTEJANO, supra note 52, at 191.
62. See GROSS, supra note 36, at 269. "Thus, in Texas and California, Mexican

Americans suffered many of the Jim Crow practices endured by African Americans there and
in the South. And, like blacks, they responded to racial injustice by organizing, petitioning,
and litigating." Id.; BRIAN D.

BEHNKEN, FIGHTING THEIR OWN BATTLES:
MEXICAN
AMERICANS, AFRICAN AMERICANS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN TEXAS 3 (2011).

"Much like their African American counterparts, Mexican American civil rights activists
focused on military service and lawsuits to challenge the segregation of Mexican origin
people." Id.
63. 33 S.W.2d 790 (1930). "This [Salvatierra] case was the first Mexican American
desegregation lawsuit in the State of Texas." VALENCIA, supra note 58, at 15.
64. For more on LULAC, see CYNTHIA E. OROZCo, No MEXICANS, WOMEN OR DOGS
ALLOWED: THE RISE OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2009). "In this
social, political, legal and diplomatic context, Mexican Americans organized a number of civic
groups that were specifically formed to fight discriminatory practices against their own
community. Business leaders created the League of United Latin American Citizens... in
1929, for example, at the height of a nativist movement in the U.S. that fostered the revival of
the Ku Klux Klan and led the federal government to create a comprehensive regime of
immigration controls. The founders of LULAC aimed to integrate Mexican-descended

persons into the U.S. mainstream, that is, to "Americanize' the community. LULAC's
constitution called for members to be loyal citizens. It also stressed the importance of learning
English." Wilson, supra note 37, at 154.
65. VALENCIA, supra note 58, at 16. See also CARLOS KEVIN BLANTON, THE STRANGE
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the first three grades in a separate school building. The white children were
taught in a separate school. The school district claimed that it segregated the
Mexican-American children because they started school late since they were
migrant farm workers and because of linguistic problems arising out of the
assertion that they spoke Spanish and not English.66 The court ruled:
That the school authorities have no power to arbitrarily segregate
Mexican children, assign them to separate schools, and exclude
them from schools maintained for children of other white races,
merely or solely because they are Mexicans. An unlawful
segregation will be effectuated if the rules for segregation are
arbitrary and are applied indiscriminately to all Mexican pupils in
those grades without regard to their individual aptitudes or
attainments, while relieving children of other white races from the
operation of the rules, even though some of them, as for instance,
those who tardily enter the terms, may be subject to the
classification given the Mexican children. To the extent that the
classification is arbitrarily imposed upon those of one race, but
relaxed in its application to those of other races so as to exclude
the latter from its operation, it constitutes an unlawful racial
discrimination.67
The court ruled that it could not say that the district's reason for
segregating the Mexican-American children was "unreasonable, if
impartially applied to all students alike .... To the extent that the plan
adopted is applied in good faith ...with no intent or effect to discriminate
against any of the races involved, it cannot be said that the plan is unlawful
or violative even of the spirit of the constitution., 68 The court then held that
the plaintiffs had no right of action "[s]ince it has not been shown in this case
that the school authorities are at this time enforcing unlawful segregation
against any particular child or children, or intends to do so, or that the
CAREER OF BILINGUAL EDUCATION IN TEXAS, 1836-1981 95 (2004). "Litigated by LULAC

attorneys, the Salvatierracase first challenged the segregation of Mexican American children
in Texas and the American Southwest." Id.
66. Id. at 17. "Rather, the basis for the separation lay on two educational grounds. First,
the superintendent noted that about half of the Mexican-American childrenjoined their parents
in the migratory stream of picking cotton and working on ranches during part of the school
year. As a result, the superintendent added, the children upon return to school were several
months 'retarded from the standpoint of enrollment,' and thus for the children to receive
efficient instruction they needed to be segregated in the Mexican school. Second, the
superintendent testified that the Mexican American children required segregated instruction
because of language needs." Id.
67. Salvatierra,33 S.W. 2d at 795.
68. Id.
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individual complainants are suffering or threatened with injury and damage
peculiar to themselves...""
The court seems to misdescribe and misinterpret the situation. There
was a good argument that the reasons offered by the district for segregation
were pretextual and that in fact the discrimination was based on race and
therefore was unlawful and arbitrary. For instance, the Superintendent
testified that he did not segregate the white children who started school late
into the school for the Mexican-American children.7 ° Moreover, the
Superintendent based segregation on the fact that the Mexican-American
children spoke Spanish even though he admitted in his testimony that "the
best way to learn a language is to be associated with the people who speak
that language .71 This would have meant that the Spanish speaking children
should have been integrated into the school for white children so that the
Mexican-American children would have the best prospects for learning
English. Thus, "[i]n Salvatierra, the educational justification for the
segregation of the Mexican American was merely a smoke screen for the
school board's race based opposition to mixing
young Mexican American
72
and white children in the same classroom.,
Just as Charles Mill's theory would predict, the court seems to have been
constructing a racial fantasyland where racial discrimination did not exist
even though there was evidence indicating the presence of discrimination
based on race. The court seemed unable to perceive this reality as it observed:
It is to the credit of both races that notwithstanding widely diverse racial
characteristics, they dwell together in friendship, peace, and unity, and work
amicably together for the common good and a common country. Racial
dissensions, if any occur, are so rare and slight as to escape public notice, and
we look in vain into the law books for evidences of such dissensions. It is a
matter of pride and gratification in our great public educational system and
its administration that the question of race segregation, as between Mexicans
and other white races, has not heretofore found its way into the courts of this
state, and therefore the decision of no Texas court is available in the

69. Id. at 796.
70. 33 S.W. 2d at 793.
71. Id.
72. VALENCIA, supra note 58, at 18. See also GROSS, supra note 36, at 255. "Unlike

earlier trials, these twentieth century trials were less the genuine efforts of a white society to
determine what race was and how it should be treated than the strategic attempts of a selfconsciously racist society to segregate a group perceived as nonwhite without admitting that
the segregation was based on race per se. In the court records, unself-consciously racist
statements sit side by side with elaborate efforts to deny racial prejudice, and the court actors
seem less concerned with understanding race than with finding acceptable ways to enforce the
racial views they already held." Id.

Summer 2020

LAW, RACE, AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF IGNORANCE

523

disposition of the precise question presented here.73
Contrary to the court's description of alleged racial harmony in Texas,
Texas was, in fact, well-known for its racism against Mexican-Americans.
As Professor Kevin Johnson has explained:
Although not alone in discriminating against persons of Mexican
ancestry, Texas earned a reputation for its multi-racial caste
system. Indeed, in negotiating the agreements with the United
States creating the Bracero Program, the Mexican government
initially insisted on barring temporary workers from employment
in Texas because of the notorious discrimination against persons
of Mexican ancestry in the Lone Star State.
Significantly, the epistemological mischaracterization of MexicanAmenicans as white, as we observed in the context ofjury selection, was also
used to subordinate Mexican-Americans in the context of school segregation.
School districts "cynically employed 'Mexican Americans' status as 'white'
to 'desegregate' black schools by integrating them with Mexican
Ameicans-much as the courts of the 1940s had cynically relied on
Mexicans' 'whiteness' to deny their civil rights claims. 75 Historian Brian
Behnken explains how this "integration" and "desegregation" worked: [since
the school district] still classified Mexican Americans as white, by pairing
[Mexican American] schools and black schools the district achieved
'integration.' [Mexican Americans] would serve as symbolic 'whites' for
desegregation purposes-'pawns, puppets, and scapegoats' as one activist76
put it-thereby ensuring that predominantly Anglo schools remained white.
V.

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND THE
EPISTEMOLOGY OF IGNORANCE

With respect to the epistemology of ignorance, "a lack of knowledge...
often is actively [or consciously] produced for purposes of domination and
exploitation.
Sometimes the ignorance is unconsciously produced.78
One of the areas where there is evidence of the epistemology of
ignorance being used against racial minorities in law is in the context of
73. Salvatierra,33 S.W. 2d at 794.
74. Johnson, supra note 37, at 155-56. See also BEHNKEN, supra note 62, at 28 ("The

Mexican Jim Crow also threatened to undermine the Bracero Program. Indeed, due to
segregation the Mexican government banned braceros from working in Texas").
75.
76.
77.
78.

GROss, supra note 36, at 289.
BEHNKEN, supra note 62, at 200.
Sullivan & Tuana, supra note 4, at 1.
Id. at 1-2.
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employment discrimination lawsuits. In this connection, "Section 703 of
Title VII prohibits employers from failing or refusing to hire, or from
discharging or otherwise discriminating against any individual because of his
or her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
In the context of an
employment discrimination lawsuit, once a plaintiff has made a prima facie
case80 of employment discrimination, the defendant must produce a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action.8 ' Once the
defendant has produced such a reason, plaintiff must prove that the reason or
reasons are merely pretextual and the true reason is discriminatory. 2
One way that the epistemology of ignorance arises in the area of
employment law, then, is that defendants will often give reasons for their
actions which are not the real or true reasons for their actions-i.e., as
predicted by the epistemology of ignorance, they will misdescribe or
misrepresent reality. Consider some examples of this misdescription or
cover-up of the true reasons for employer actions.8 3

79. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The ContentofOur Categories:A CognitiveBias Approach
to Discrimination and EqualEmployment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1168 (1995).
80. "The McDonnell Douglas-Burdine prima facie case merely attempts to 'rule out the
most common reasons for adverse job actions,' entitling the plaintiff who proves a prima facie
case to a presumption that intentional discrimination has taken place." Deborah C. Malamud,
The LastMinuet: DisparateTreatment after Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229, 2233 (1995). For
instance, "[i]n a termination case ...
,to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff need only
show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class...; (2) he was working in ajob for which
he was qualified; (3) his employment was terminated; and (4) his position remained open or
was subsequently filled by someone of similar qualifications." Krieger, supra note 79, at
1177.
81. Tex. Depart. of Community Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981). See also
Malamud, supra note 80, at 2233. "Inorder to avoid a directed verdict, the employer must
then meet a burden of production-as opposed to a burden of persuasion-by introducing
evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision." Id.
82. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56. See also Krieger, supra note 79, at 1178. "Under the
McDonnellDouglaslBurdinemodel of disparate treatment proof, after a defendant articulates
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the contested employment decision, the plaintiff can
prevail only by proving that the proffered reason was not the 'true reason' for the decision, but
a 'pretext for discrimination.' In any cause adjudicated under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
paradigm, the reason an employer offered to explain the negative action taken against a target
employee must accordingly be classified as either the 'true' reason for its action or a 'phony
reason'-a 'sham,' 'mask,' 'facade,' or 'cover-up' for the 'true' discriminatory motive. Given
the rhetoric of McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, finding against an employer at the third
stage of proof is, in essence, finding that the employer has lied to the plaintiff and the court."
Id.
83. "The most common method of proving pretext is to show that the employer's
proffered reason is not worthy of credence either because it appears implausible in light of
data upon which such an employment decision should have been based,or because it appears
inconsistent with decisions reached in similar cases involving employees outside of plaintiff's
protected class .... More specifically ... the conscious discriminatory purpose required to

prevail in a disparate treatment case might be inferred from the following types of evidence:
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For instance, in Jaureguiv. City of Glendale,84 a Hispanic police officer
who had been denied promotion seven times brought a lawsuit against the
City of Glendale alleging that the City had discriminated against him on the
basis of race or national origin in violation of Title VII. The City defended
on the ground that "Jauregui was never promoted because he possesses poor
interpersonal relationship skills and strong interpersonal skills are essential
for a police supervisor. 8 5 The district court held that "Jauregui had been
discriminated against in violation of Title VII. 8' 6 The City's statement
purporting to justify the failure to promote constitutes a misrepresentation,
thus implicating the epistemology of ignorance. That this is the case is
clearly seen in the fact that, on review, the court of appeals found that the
City's asserted justification was a mere pretext and misdescription of reality
because (1) the City had failed to include "specific examples of Officer
Jauregui's purported lack of interpersonal relationship skills•.. in his
performance evaluations" and (2) a white male police officer "with lower
scores on the objective examinations" was "promoted over Officer Jauregui"
even though the white officer "had a lack of 'interpersonal relationship skills'
recorded in his performance evaluations. 8 7 The court found that this
"inconsistency in the City's selective application of its asserted basis for
denying promotion itself creates an inference of unlawful discrimination."8
Similarly, in Bennum v. Rutgers State University,89 Alfred Bennum, a
Hispanic Associate Professor who was denied promotion to full professor,
brought a Title VII lawsuit against Rutgers University alleging that he had
been denied a promotion on the basis of race or national origin. The District
Court found that Bennun had established "a prima facie case of disparate
treatment and that Rutgers's proffered nondiscriminatory reason, failure to
meet the university's high standards for full professorship ... was a pretext
(1) Evidence that the objective data maintained by the defendant did not support the result
reached by the decisionmaker; (2) Evidence that the decisionmaker seemed to undervalue or
ignore facts favorable to the employee; (3) Evidence that the decisionmaker made a judgment
about the plaintiff without being able to point to specific events which would reasonably
support such a judgment; or (4) Evidence showing that similarly situated [white] employees
were on occasion treated more favorably." Krieger, supranote 79, at 1179-1180.
84. 852 F.2d 1128 (1988).
85. Id. at 1131.
86. 852F.2dat 1131.
87. Id. at 1135.
88. Id. See also Krieger, supra note 79, at 1181. "We know from our experience that
more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying
reasons, especially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an
applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely
than not the employer, whom we generally assume acts only with some reason, based his
decision on an impermissible consideration such as race." Id. (quoting Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
89. 941 F.2d 154 (1991).
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for discriminatory denial of the promotion.
,,9.o The court of appeals found
that Rutgers's purported nondiscriminatory reason for failure to promote
Bennun, "the poor quality and insufficient quantity of his research," was a
pretext because white professors were granted promotion under more lenient
standards than were applied to Bennun. 91 For instance, the University had
found that a white professor's publications were "above average in
quantity... while Bennun's publication rate was questionable," even though
Bennun had 18 more publications than the white professor.9 2 Again, this case
shows how the dominant group misrepresents or misdescribes reality by
providing pretextual reasons for their employment actions in a way that
implicates the epistemology of ignorance. Indeed, some scholars argue that
the employment "law of pretext in general" is deeply problematic in that it
"emboldens employers to lie about their true motivations and facilitates their
avoidance of liability by relying on secrets and lies." 93
Moreover, the epistemology of ignorance is protected and promoted by
making summary judgment easier to obtain for employers-and thereby
enabling them to win without a trial-in cases where pretextual reasons have
been advanced to justify employment decisions taken against minority
employee plaintiffs. In such situations, the proof structure associated with
the legal doctrine in this area-namely, the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine line
of cases-to the extent that it "does shape decisionmaking [on summary
judgment], its effects are often detrimental to [employee] plaintiffs ...
because McDonnall Douglas-Burdine renders courts less able to recognize
forms of discrimination that do not straightforwardly match the proof
structure's template.9
90. Id. at 158-59.
91. 941 F.2d at 177, 178-180.
92. Id. at 179. See also, Krieger, supra note 79, at 1181. "Pretext analysis thus rests on

the assumption that, absent discriminatory animus, employment decisionmakers are rational
actors. They make evenhanded decisions using optimal inferential strategies in which all
relevant behavioral events are identified and weighted to account for transient situational
factors beyond the employee's control If an employer's proffered explanation for its decision
is shown to be irrational or implausible in light of the relevant data set, the trier of fact may
conclude, and to find for the plaintiff, must conclude, that the reasons given did not really
motivate the decisionmaker, but were simply contrived to mask discriminatory intent." Id.;
Malamud, supra note 80, at 2258 n. 100. "The growing literature of the critical race theory
movement is built upon, and stands witness to, the perception by legal scholars from 'outsider'
groups that 'racism is normal, not aberrant, in American society' . . . a perception that would
support the conclusion that 'arbitrary' decisions that are adverse to 'outsiders' are in fact
discriminatory." Id. (quoting Richard Delgado, Introductionin CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
CUTTING EDGE XIV (Richard Delgado Ed. 1995)).

93. Natasha T. Martin, Colloquium: Pretext in Peril, 75 Mo. L. REV. 313, 329 (2010)
(citing Catherine J. Lanctot, Secrets andLies: The Needfor a Definitive Rule of Law in Pretext
Cases, 61 LA. L. REV. 539 (2001)).
94. Malamud, supranote 80, at 2279-2280.
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Beyond all of this, perhaps the best way of proving such discriminatory
discharge or treatment is by showing that similarly situated employees have
been treated differently.95 However, where the employer lacks knowledge
that similarly situated employees have been treated differently, such
ignorance may constitute a defense to the allegation that discrimination has
taken place. 96 Thus, as predicted by the epistemology of ignorance, the
ignorance of the employer enables the employer to engage in racial
domination or discrimination and undermine the rights of minority
employees.
VI.

IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY IN THE TRUMP

ERA AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF IGNORANCE
In November 2016, Donald Trump was elected President of the United
States.97 Some contend that Trump was elected President because he took a
very strong position on immigration enforcement.98 Among other things,
Trump strongly attacked immigrants from Mexico and promised to construct

95. See Martin, supra note 93, at 323. "To show pretext, the plaintiff presents evidence
from which one can draw a discriminatory animus. The method of presenting pretextual
evidence varies widely, but the most common avenues include the use of comparative data
involving similarly situated individuals, statistics reflecting the overall composition of the
employer's workforce, inconsistencies or contradictions in the employer's explanation or
other information surrounding the circumstances of the plaintiff's employment that raise an
inference of discrimination." Id.
96. See Mechnig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 864 F.2d 1359, 1366 (7th Cir. 1988).
97. Bill Ong Hing, Entering the Trump Ice Age: Contextualizing the New Immigration
Enforcement Regime, 5 TEX. A&M L. REv. 253, 255 (2018).
98. Id at 256. See also Kristina M. Campbell, DreamersDeferred. The Broken Promise
of Immigration Reform in the Obama Years, 25 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL'Y. 1, 4 n.15 (2018).
"Since he assumed office in January 2017, there has arguably been no issue used more by
President Trump than immigration in order to both unite his supporters and divide his
opponents." Id.; Gowri J. Krishna, Growing the Resistance: A Call to Action for Transactional
Lawyers in the Era of Trump, 7 TENN. J. RACE GENDER & S. J. 206, 211 (2018). "Trump's
campaign rhetoric" spoke "of removing all undocumented immigrants from the U.S." Id.;
Jayashri Srikantiah & Shirin Sinnar, White Nationalism as Immigration Policy, 71 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 197, 198 (2019). "[Trump] began his presidential campaign by denouncing
Mexican migrants as 'rapists'." Id.; Kevin R. Johnson, The New Latinx "Repatriation"?
Removals, CriminalJustice, and the Efforts to Remove Latinx Peoplesfrom the United States,
U. OF CAL. DAVIS LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES, March 18, 2019, at 22. "From day one of
his campaign, [Trump] made aggressive immigration enforcement the cornerstone of his
platform." Id.
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a "great, great wall99 along the southern border."' 00 In addition, Trump called
for "atotal and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States."''
Shortly after Trump was sworn in as President of the United States, on
January 27, 2017, Trump promulgated an Executive Order 13, 769 (EO-1)
which sought to ban immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United
States from seven primarily Muslim nations: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia,
Sudan, Syria and Yemen. 10 2 The legality and constitutionality of the order
was almost immediately challenged in the lower federal courts and in
Washington v. Trump, 10 3 the federal district court enjoined the enforcement
of EO-1.° 4 Subsequently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's injunctive order. 10 5 In the face of this judicial
action, President Trump issued an amended Executive Order 3,780 (EO-2)
on March 6, 2017, to replace the first EO- 1.106 EO-2 again barred entry into
the United States from predominantly Muslim countries but sought to correct
some of the problems that the lower courts had found in EO-1.° 7 EO-2 was
subsequently enjoined by federal district courts in Hawaii, 08 and in
Maryland. 10 9 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits
affirmed these injunctions."l 0 In response to these judicial decisions,
President Trump on September 24, 2017, announced a Presidential
proclamation (the Proclamation) restricting immigration from eight
99. Professor Hing explains the symbolism of the wall: "To the Author, the symbolism
is significant. Its message of exclusion is clear. Latinos-primarily Mexicans-are not
wanted. But the message of exclusion reaches communities on both sides of the borderLatinos are not wanted on either side of the border. This is a message not simply intended for
undocumented immigrants. The Wall's message is one of de-legitimizing Latinos already in
the United States." Hing, supra note 97, at 319-320.
100. Hing, supra note 97, at 256-57. See also Donald Trump Speech, Debates and
Campaign Quotes, NEWSDAY, Nov. 10, 2016. With respect to Mexican immigrants, Trump

observed: "When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're sending
people who have lots of problems, and they're bringing problems with us. They're bringing
drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And, some, I assume, are good people." Id.
101. Earl M. Maltz, The Constitutionand the Trump Travel Ban, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REv. 391, 392 (2018). See also Shalin Bhargava Ray, Plenary Power and Animus in
ImmigrationLaw, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 21-22 (2019). "Critics note that President Trump has a

long history of expressing animus towards people of color and Muslims during his campaign
and after taking the oath of office." Id.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017).
No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017).
Wash. v. Trump, supra note 103, at *1.
Wash. v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017).
Exec. Order No. 13,780 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017).
Id. §2(c), 82 Fed. Reg. at 13213.
Haw. v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw. 2017).
Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md. 2017).

110. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4 t' Cir. 2017); Haw. v.
Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017).
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countries."' Again, the Proclamation was enjoined by district courts in
Maryland and Hawaii." 2 The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth
Circuits affirmed the issuance of the injunctions, with the Fourth Circuit
holding that the Proclamation violated the Establishment Clause of the U.S.
Constitution and the Ninth Circuit finding the Proclamation violated the
Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA). 113 On appeal in the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Court upheld in a 5-4 decision the validity of the travel ban
announced in the Proclamation. 114 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Roberts concluded that the Proclamation did not violate either the INA or the
Establishment clause. 115 The U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Muslim
travel ban case implicates the epistemology of ignorance.
As to the epistemology of ignorance "a lack of knowledge ... often is

actively [or consciously] produced" or unconsciously produced in order to
subordinate or oppress people. 116 This phenomenon has occurred in the
Muslim travel ban case in a very striking way. In the Travel ban case, the
Supreme Court has, in essence, produced ignorance which has enabled the
government to engage in discrimination and subordinate ethnic or religious
minorities. As Justice Sotomayor observed in her dissent in the Muslim
travel ban case, the Supreme Court failed to uphold the First Amendment
guarantee by leaving "undisturbed a policy first advertised openly and
unequivocally as a 'total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the
United States behind a fagade of national security concerns."'117 In so doing,
the court actively produced a lack of knowledge of the President's true
primary motives in enacting the Proclamation or executive order banning
travel to the United States. The court, in essence, ignored a series of
Presidential statements which demonstrated the intent to discriminate against
Muslims. Justice Sotomayor sets out the following to demonstrate that "the
Proclamation was motivated by hostility and animus to the Muslim faith"' 1"8 :

111. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 45165-67 (Sept. 24, 2017).
112. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570 (D. Md. 2017);
Haw. v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (D. Haw. 2017). "[The Proclamation] was challenged
in federal court. Plaintiffs were Hawaii, the Muslim Association of Hawaii, and three
individuals. Plaintiffs claimed that [the Proclamation] prevented their affiliates from entering
the United States in violation of, among other things, the [Immigration and Nationality Act]
and the Establishment Clause." Comment, First Amendment Establishment Clause
JudicialReview or Pretext Trump v. Hawaii, 132 HARv. L. REv. 327, 328 (2018).

113. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2018); Haw. v.
Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017).
114. Trumpv. Haw., 138 S.Ct. 2392 (2018).
115. Trumpv. Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2415, 2423.
116. See Sullivan & Tuana, supra note 4, at 1-2.
117. Trumpv. Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2433.
118. Id. at 2435.
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(1) "[O]n December 7, 2015 [Trump] issued a formal 'statement'
calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering
the United States""' 9
(2) "In January 2016, during a Republican primary debate," Trump
stated that he did not want "to 'rethink [his] position on banning
Muslims from entering the country. '120
(3) "In March 2016, he expressed his belief that 'Islam hates us ...
[W]e can't allow people coming into the country who have this
hatred of the United States [a]nd of people who are not
Muslim.'"121

(4) In March 2016, "Trump called for surveillance of mosques in
the United States, blaming terrorist attacks on Muslim's
lack of
22
'assimilation' and their commitment to 'sharia law."1
(5) That same month, he stated that "Muslims 'do not respect us at
all.,'"123
(6) In June 2016, he used somewhat different language and
characterized his "proposal as a suspension of immigration
from countries where there's a proven history of terrorism" but
he stated that in so doing he was not "'pulling back from' his
124
pledged Muslim ban."'
(7) "On January 27, 2017 ... Trump signed EO-1 entitled
"Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry in the
United States.' 125 The next day one of Trump's advisers
indicated EO-1 was a legal version of the Muslim ban. 126 On
February 3, 2017, a federal district court in Washington
enjoined the enforcement of EO-1.127 The United States
declined to continue defending EO-1 and stated that the
President would issue a new executive order in place of EO1.128

(8) "On March 6, 2017, President Trump issued [EO-2].' 29 One
of Trump's advisers stated that "the EO-2 would 'have the same

119. Id.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Trump v. Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2435-36.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Trump v. Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2437.
Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (EO-2).
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basic policy outcome' as EO-1."' 3 ° U.S. district courts in
Hawaii and Baltimore enjoined EO-2 and its travel bans before
it could take effect. The Fourth and Ninth Circuit affirmed
those orders. 13 1 In June 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari and allowed 3certain
aspects of the EO-2 to go into
2
1
appeal.
pending
effect
(9) While lawsuits were pending, Trump made additional
assertions suggesting that Muslims should be excluded from the
U.S.A. 13 3 For instance, Trump said "that EO-2 was just a
'watered down version of the first one."" 13 4 He also asserted
"that it was 'very hard' for Muslims to assimilate into Western
culture.,' 135
In September 2017, "Trump issued the
Proclamation which restricts entry of certain nationals from six
Muslim-majority countnes. '' 136 In November 2017, Trump
retweeted three anti-Muslim videos. 137 The White House
Deputy Press Secretary explained the videos by relating them
to the Proclamation observing "that the 'President has been
talking about these security issues for years now, from the
campaign trail to the White House' and 'has addressed those
issues with the travel order that he issued earlier this year and
the companion Proclamation. '"138
Given all of this, Justice Sotomayor states that "a reasonable observer
would conclude that the Proclamation was driven primarily by anti-Muslim
animus rather than by the Government's asserted national security
justifications.' 39
Despite this, the majority actively produces ignorance as to the main
reason for the issuance of the Proclamation which results in the subordination
of Muslims-a religious or ethnic minority. The Court observed that the
issue is "not whether to denounce the statements" but rather the "significance
130. Trump v. Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2437.
131. Id.
132. Id.

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2438.
137. Id.

138. Trump v. Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2438.
139. Id. See also Comment, FirstAmendment EstablishmentClause, supra note 112,

at 334. "On one view, some of the President's statements were 'smoking gun' evidence that
[the Proclamation] arose from a desire to target foreign nationals on the basis of religion. 'I
think Islam hates us,' he had said, 'and we can't allow people coming into this country who
have this hatred of the United States."' Id.
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of those statements in reviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its face,
addressing amatter within the core of executive responsibility."' 4 ° The Court
observed that "[flor more than a century, this court has recognized that the
admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a fundamental sovereign
attribute exercised by the government's political departments largely immune
from judicial control.''
The Court then said that when the executive
excludes a foreign national from entering "on the basis of a facially legitimate
and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that
discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the asserted
constitutional interests of U.S. citizens.' 142 The Court further explained that
this "deferential standard of review" has been applied "across different
contexts and constitutional claims" and ..has particular force' in admission
143
and immigration cases that overlap with 'the area of national security. Although the Court said that an application of this deferential Mandel
standard would ask "only whether the policy is facially legitimate and bona
fide," it nevertheless stated that "for our purposes today, we assume that we
may look behind the face of the Proclamation to the extent of applying
rational basis review.' 144 This standard of review asks "whether the entry
policy is plausibly related to the Government's stated objective to protect the
country and improve vetting processes." 45 As a result, the Court said that it
"may consider plaintiffs' extrinsic evidence, but will uphold the policy as
long as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification
independent of unconstitutional grounds.' 4 6 Given this, the Court then
observed that it "hardly ever strikes down a policy as illegitimate under
rational basis scrutiny."' 147 And the Court stated that it had struck down
policy under the rational basis standard only when "the laws at issue lack any
purpose other than a 'bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular

group. "14" The Court then held that this Proclamation is related to legitimate
state interests and that it cannot be said that the Proclamation is .. inexplicable
by anything but animus."" 149 The Court held that "there is persuasive
evidence that the entry suspension has a legitimate grounding in national
security concerns. ' ' 15' For example, the Court pointed out (1) that "the

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Trump v. Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2418.
Id.
Id.at2419.
Trump v.Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2419.
Id.at 2420.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 2420-21.
Id.at 2421.
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Proclamation is expressly premised on legitimate purposes: preventing entry
of nationals who cannot be adequately vetted and inducing other nations to
improve their practices," (2) that "the text says nothing about religion," (3)
that the "policy covers just 8% of the world's Muslim population," (4) that
the policy "reflects the results of a worldwide review process undertaken by
multiple Cabinet officials and their agencies," (5) that "since the President
introduced entry restrictions ...three Muslim-majority countries ...have

been removed from the list of covered countries" and that the Proclamation
states that the restrictions "will remain in force only so long as necessary to
'address the identified inadequacies and risks,"' (6) "the Proclamation
includes significant exceptions for various categories of foreign nationals,"
and (7) "the Proclamation creates a waiver program open to all covered
foreign nationals seeking entry as immigrants or non-immigrants.' 151 The
Court held that "[u]nder these circumstances, the Government has set forth a
sufficient national security justification to survive rational basis review. ,,152
In so doing, the Court, in essence, ignored the strong evidence that the
Proclamation was primarily the result of prejudice against Muslims. The use
of the rational based scrutiny allows the Court to, in essence, set aside the
discriminatory statements against Muslims. As Justice Sotomayor pointed
out in her dissent, the majority "utterly failed to address in it legal analysis"
the President's statements which "strongly support the conclusions that the
Proclamation was issued to express hostility toward Muslims and exclude
them from the country."' 153 As a result, Justice Sotomayor concluded that "it
simply cannot be said that the Proclamation has a legitimate basis.' 154 The
majority of the Court has therefore actively constructed an ignorance as to
the primary reason for the issuance of the Proclamation. As Justice
Sotomayor explained, the Court has accepted the government's invitation to
set aside "the President's problematic statements" and "defer to the President
on immigration and national security.' 5 5 Indeed, Sotomayor said that the
majority sees6 "the President's charged statements about Muslims as
5
irrelevant." 1
Another striking way in which the majority constructed ignorance as to
whether the Proclamation was motivated by bias against Muslims as opposed
151. Trumpv. Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2421.
152. Id. at 2423.
153. Id.at 2442.
154. Id.
155. Trumpv. Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2440.
156. Id. at 2447. See also Comment, FirstAmendment Establishment Clause, supra
note 112, at 334. "The travel ban decision thus suggests that even the strongest evidence of
discriminatory motive will not trigger heightened scrutiny, so long as that evidence is extrinsic
to the face of the law under challenge. So even when challengers to a law like [the
Proclamation] can persuade a court to 'look behind' that law, doing so may be futile." Id.
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to national security is found in the fact that the government refused to make
the administrative process reports on which the Proclamation was
purportedly based available to the public. 157 Obviously, it would be difficult
to make an informed decision as opposed to a decision based on ignorance
that the Proclamation was based on legitimate national security reasons when
the supporting documents and reports are not publicly available.
Interestingly, some commentators were hopeful that in the Travel Ban
case Justice Kennedy might be "perhaps most primed for edification
regarding the newly manifest points of perfunctory judicial review in
exclusion cases.' l5
They thought that Justice Kennedy's "reputation as
defender of Constitutional liberty" might lead Kennedy to find, in light of
"Trump's extensive record of anti-Muslim statements," that Trump's facially
neutral "national security interest was provided in bad faith, as a pretext for
its [anti]Muslim] purpose."' 159 However, this hope proved to be in vain.
Justice Kennedy joined "the Court's opinion [in Trump v. Hawaii] in
whole."' 6 ° Justice Kennedy expressed only a seemingly empty admonition
that:
[T]here are numerous instances in which the statements and
actions of government officials are not subject to judicial scrutiny
or intervention. That does not mean those officials are free to
disregard the Constitution and the rights it proclaims and protects.
The oath that all officials take to adhere to the Constitution is not
confined to those spheres in which the judiciary can correct or
even comment upon what those officials say or do. Indeed, the
very fact that an official may have broad discretion, discretion free
from judicial scrutiny, makes it all the more imperative for him or
her to adhere to the Constitution and to its meaning and
promise.' 6'
157. Id. at 2443 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Int'l Refugee Assistance Projectv. Trump
(IRAP I1), 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2018)) ("[T]he government chose not to make the review

publicly available" even in redacted form.).
158. Matthew J. Lindsay, The Perpetual "Invasion": Pastas Prologue in Constitutional
ImmigrationLaw, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 369, 385 (2018).

159. Id. at 390.

160. Trump v. Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2423 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
161. Id. at 2424; see also Frank Colucci, When Structure Fails:Justice Kennedy, Liberty
and Trump v. Hawaii, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1141, 1142 (2019) ("Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's

final concurrence in Trump v. Hawaii shaped both initial reactions to his retirement from the
U.S. Supreme Court and first assessments of his legacy. Commentators called his vote to join
the Trump majority, which allowed President Trump's order banning entry by nationals of
several countries to take effect, a 'betrayal,' a 'surrender,' and a 'coup.' Others categorized
Kennedy's last opinion as 'depressing defeatism,' 'at odds' with the 'animating principles' of
his larger approach to law. Still others read it as an 'empty gesture' and 'an expression of
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Beyond the Travel Ban case, the Trump administration has practiced the
epistemology of ignorance-misrepresentation and misinterpretation-in
regard to other immigration issues. Perhaps the central focus of Trump's
presidential campaign was on immigration issues. 162 He particularly
encouraged a crackdown on immigrants of color. 163
Indeed, one
commentator has argued that Trump's immigration enforcement initiatives,
which largely target Latinos, constitute "a concerted effort to remove
[Latino] people, including large numbers of Mexicans and Central Americans
from the United States.' 6 4 In so doing, he made misrepresentations,
implicating the epistemology of ignorance, to justify immigration
enforcement efforts against Latinos and others and thereby helped advance
the oppression and exclusion of immigrants of color. As a result, Trump
helped preserve the socially dominant position of white Americans. First,
Trump argues that President Obama had failed to enforce the immigration
laws. 165 This was a misrepresentation of fact. In reality, President Obama
deported extremely large numbers of undocumented immigrants on the order
of about 400,000 persons per year. 166 Trump used this alleged lack of
enforcement of immigration laws to justify the implementation of draconian
defeat and a loss').
162. Lindsay, supranote 158, at 369 ("Donald Trump ascended to the presidency largely
on the promise to protect the American people-their physical and financial security, their
culture and language, even the integrity of their electoral system against an invading foreign
menace").
163. Id (During the campaign, Trump argued that "[o]nly extraordinary defensive
measures, including 'extreme vetting' of would be immigrants, a ban on Muslims entering the
United States, and a 2,000-mile-long wall along the nation's southern border could repel the
encroaching hordes").
164. Johnson, supra note 98, at 4
165. President Donald Trump, Immigration Speech (Sept. 1, 2016).
166. Brian Bennett, U.S. Reported Record Numbers ofImmigrants, L.A. TIMEs (Oct. 6,
2010), https ://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-oct-06-la-na-illegal-immigration-201
01007-story.htnil; see also Campbell, supra note 98, at 14 ("Deportations increased during the
first four years of Obama' s presidency with a high of 400,000 noncitizens being removed from
the United States in 2012. The total number of persons removed by the Obama Administration
exceeded the total number of persons removed in the prior 100 years. While Obama and
members of his administration argued that they were merely enforcing the law as dictated by
Congress, the fact remains that the manner in which the DHS aggressively enforced the
removal of noncitizens is unparalleled. The Agency's myopic focus on removing 'criminal
aliens' from the United States has resulted in the inequitable and unjust enforcement of
immigration law, causing the removal of thousands of long-term legal permanent residents of
the United States ...and other legal noncitizens convicted of misdemeanors and other nonserious crimes"); Serena Marshall, Obama Has Deported More People Than Any Other
President,ABC NEWS (Aug. 29, 2016), https ://abcnews.go.com/Politics/obamas-deportationpolicy-numbers/story?id=41715661 ("Between 2009 and 2015, [Barack Obama's]
administration has removed more than 2.5 million people through immigration orders, which
doesn't include the number of people who 'self-deported' or were turned away and/or returned
to their home country at the border by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).").
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immigration laws and policies directed especially at Latinos and Muslims.
Beyond this, President Trump issued two additional executive orders
which were aimed at immigration enforcement on the border and in the
interior of the nation.167 The Trump administration attempted to justify these
orders and their expanded enforcement of the immigration laws against
undocumented immigrants on the grounds that immigrants constitute a crime
problem. For instance the Interior E.O. provides:
Tens of thousands of removable aliens have been released into
communities across the country, solely because their home
countries refuse to accept their repatriation. Many of these aliens
are criminals who have served time in our federal, state and local
jails. The presence of such individuals in the United States, and
the practices of foreign nations that refuse the repatriation
of their
8
nationals, are contrary to the national interest. 16
Likewise, the Border E.O. provides:
[T]ransnational criminal organizations operate sophisticated drug
and human trafficking networks and smuggling operations on both
sides of the southern border, contributing to a significant increase
in violent crime and United States deaths from dangerous drugs.
Among those who illegally enter are those who seek to harass
Americans through acts of terror or criminal conduct. Continued
illegal immigration presents a clear and present danger to the
169
interests of the United States.
These claims regarding the criminal threat allegedly posed by
undocumented immigrants constitute misrepresentations and, therefore,
implicate the epistemology of ignorance. In fact, scholars have long pointed
out that "immigrants are less likely to commit serious crimes or be behind
bars than the native born, and high rates of immigration are associated with
170
lower rates of violent crime and property crime.'

167. See Exec. Order No. 13767 of Jan. 25, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017)

[hereinafter Border EQ..]; Exec. Order No. 13768 of Jan. 25, 2017 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan.
25, 2017) (hereinafter InteriorE.0.).
168. Interior E.., supra note 167, at § 1; Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil
Rights in the Trump Administration: Law and Policy Making by Executive Order, 57 SANTA
CLARAL. REV. 611, 633 (2017).
169. Border EO., supra note 167, at § 1; Johnson, supra note 168, Immigration and
Civil Rights in the Trump Administration, at 633.
170. Walter Ewing et. al., The Criminalizationof Immigrationin the UnitedStates, AM.
IMMIGR. COUNS. (July 13, 2015), https://www.americanimnmiigrationcouncil.org/research/
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In addition, we see another example of the epistemology of ignorance
at work in the area of immigration in the Trump administration in the
controversy involving the separation of children from undocumented parents
at the border. In April 2018, the Trump administration stated that it would
enact a so-called "zero tolerance" immigration policy by which they would
bring a criminal prosecution against all adults who illegally enter into the
United States. 171 If these detained and criminally charged adults had children
with them, the children were separated from them because the children are
not criminally charged and could not be placed in jail. 172 The government
separated about 2,500 children from their parents as a result of this zero
tolerance policy. 173 The United States Department of Health and Human
174
Services Office of Refugee Resettlement took custody of these children.
Once word reached the general public about the separation of children from
their parents, many were outraged. 175 Former First Ladies expressed their

criminalization-imiigration-united-states; see also Philip L. Torrey, Alternative Facts in the
War on Immigrants, HARV. L. & POL'Y. REv. (2017), https://harvardlpr.com/2017/03/03/
alternative-facts-in-the-war-on-imiigrants; ("Here's the truth on immigrants and crime.
Numerous studies have shown that the crime rate among immigrants is significantly lower
than among native-born U.S. Citizens. In the 1990s and 2000s, as the immigrant population
dramatically grew in the United States, FBI data shows that the violent crime rate
simultaneously plummeted. These and other statistics demons6trate that the vast majority of
immigrants are law-abiding, contributing members of society"); Hing, supra note 97, at 273
("However time and again studies demonstrate that immigrants are less crime prone than
natives or have no effect on crime rates. Relatedly, macro level analysis show that 'increased
immigration does not increase crime and sometimes even causes crime rates to fall"').
171. See Marilyn Haigh, What's Happening at the Border? Here's What We Know
about Immigrant Children and Family Separations, TEX. TRIBUNE (June 18, 2018), https://

www.texastribune.org/2018/06/18/separated-immigrant-children-families-border-mexico;
see also Fatma E. Marouf, Executive Overreachingin Immigration Adjudication, 93 TUL. L.

REv. 707, 769-70 (2019) (Attorney General Sessions stated that under this "zero tolerance
you cross the Southwest border unlawfully, then we will prosecute you. It's
policy" that "'If
that simple.' . . . [and] that his goal was to prosecute '100 percent' of people who entered
without authorization.").
172. See Haigh, What's Happening at the Border, supra note 171. See also Marouf,

Executive Overreaching,supranote 171, at 772 ("[A]fter the Trump administration instituted
a 'zero tolerance policy, a new much more visible phase of family separation began. DHS
began separating children from their parents when they were apprehended together at the
border.").
173. See Haigh, supra note 171.
174. Id. ("They were sent to over a hundred different facilities for children all across the
United States. The vast majority of these children came from Guatamala (56%) and Honduras
(33O%)."); Marouf, supra note 171, at 772.

175. Id.; see also Marouf, supra note 171, at 772 ("Between April and June 2018, the
separation of children erupted into a nationwide scandal"); Mari J. Matsuda, This Is(
(ot) Wo
We Are: Korematsu,. ConstitutionalInterpretation, and National Identity, 128 YALE L.J.

FORUM (2019) ("Bear Witness: we saw children torn from their parents at the border, babies
incarcerated, toddlers appearing alone at legal hearings, children held in cages, children dying
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strong opposition to this policy.176 In denying a motion to dismiss a lawsuit
challenging the separation of children from their parents, a federal judge
stated that the allegations regarding child separation "describe government
conduct that arbitrarily tears at the sacred bond between parent and child"
and said that the conduct "is brutal, offensive, and fails to comport with
traditional notions of fair play and decency."' 177 As a result of this
controversy, the Administration began to engage in misstatements and
misrepresentations about this child separation policy in ways that implicate
the epistemology of ignorance.
The administration made numerous
misstatements regarding the separation of children. First, the president and
administration officials stated that the law or judicial decisions required the
separation of the children.178 For instance, on June 15, 2018, Trump said, "I
hate the children being taken away. The Democrats have to change their law.
That's their law.' 79 On June 7, 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions blamed
a court decision for the child separation policy: "Because of the Flores
consent decree and a 9 th Circuit decision, ICE can only keep families detained
together for a very short period of time."' 18 Similarly, White House Press
Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders stated on June 14, 2018, regarding the

in custody; psychotropic drugs and sexual abuse handed out to children at private prisons we
paid for. We witnessed and many said as loudly as they could: 'This is not who we are.' Even
an administration that first argued for the deterrent value of child separation retreated when
outrage came from within the Republican Party"); Wendy Jennings, Separating Families
WithoutDue Process:HiddenChildRemovals Closerto Home, 22 CUNY L. REv. 1, 3-4 (2019)
("In the summer of 2018, a united and forceful public outcry mounted in response to the United
States government's family separation policy at the U.S.-Mexico border. Americans across
the political spectrum protested as pictures, videos and audio recordings of children being
forcibly separated from their parents were circulated nationwide. The mainstream media, in
its coverage of the disaster, reported on the devastating consequences of removing children
from their parents. Medical groups were outraged about the impact on children, describing
the separations as child abuse. Due process and judicial oversight for the separated families
seemed to be non-existent").
176. See Matt Stevens & Sarah Mervosh, The Four Former First Ladies Condemn
Trump 's BorderPolicy, N.Y. TIMEs (June 19, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/us/
politics/first-ladies-trump-family-separation.html ("Now, in the span of about 24 hours, all
four living former first ladies have added their voices to the chorus of public critique, calling
the practice [of separating children from their parents at the border] 'immoral,' 'disgraceful'
and a 'humanitarian crisis"').
177. Erik Larson, Judge Calls Trump's Border Separations of Children 'Brutal',
BLOOMBERG (June 6, 2018), https ://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-07/aclu-suitover-child-separations-at-border-may-proceed-judge.
178. Salvador Rizzo, The Facts about Trump's Policy of Separating Families at the
Border, WASH. POST (June 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/
wp/20 18/06/19/the-facts-about-trumps-policy-of-separating-families-at-the-border.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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child separation, "It's the law and that's what the law states."''1 On June 17,
2018, Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen went so far as to state
18 2
that "We do not have a policy of separating families at the border. Period.'
These statements were all untrue. 183 They therefore constitute misstatements
and misrepresentations about the child separation policy as would be
predicted by the epistemology of ignorance. Contrary to these assertions by
Trump and his employees, "immigrant families are being separated primarily
because the Trump administration in April began to prosecute as many border
offenses as possible as part of the zero tolerance policy."' 184 As a result, "the
Trump administration implemented this policy by choice and could end it by
choice. No law or court ruling mandates family separations.
Under these circumstances, these misrepresentations regarding family
separation helped enable the subordination and exclusion of immigrants of
color, and, thereby, helped enable whites to maintain their socially dominant
position in American society. In this regard, family separation "is a
government tool of oppression that has a deeply rooted history in the United
States, tracing back to the colonization of indigenous peoples and chattel
slavery. "186 As one commentator has explained, "Trump's family separation
policy echoes the process of indigenous elimination in which indigenous
children were forcibly separated from their families and sent to government
funded residential schools," and "the forced separation of families that was
part of the African slave trade.' 87
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.; see also Marouf, supra note 171, at 772-73 ("President Trump and DHS
Secretary Nielsen initially denied having a policy of separating children, but the
administration's internal documents contradicted that assertion").
184. Rizzo, supra note 178.
185. Id.; see also Marouf, supra note 171, at 73 ("Once Trump realized the unpopularity
of the family separation policy, he blamed Democrats for it, claiming that their 'bad
legislation' was the problem and that he had no choice in the matter. However, no law required
children to be separated at the border"); see also Rose Cuison Villazor & Kevin R. Johnson,
The Trump Administration and the War on Immigration Diversity, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV.

575, 611-12 (2019) ("No previous administration resorted to the separation of families as a
device to deter migration from Central America. The Trump Administration at least for a time
pursued such a policy even though it had other policy options at its disposal. The
administration, for example, could have continued the policy of allowing bond hearings for
migrant families and releasing them if they were not a flight risk or a danger to the community.
Children thus could have been bonded out with their families so that families could have
remained intact"); see also Adela C. Licona & Eithne Luibheid, The Regime of Destruction:
Separating Families and Caging Children, 30 FEMINIST FORMATIONS, Issue 3, 45, 51 (2018)

("President Trump repeatedly claimed that he 'hated' to separate families, but was required to
do so because of 'bad laws' passed by Democrats. In fact, there isno law requiring families
crossing the border to be separated").
186. Jennings, supra note 175, at 4.
187. Monika Batra Kashyap, Unsettling Immigration Laws: Settler, Colonialism and
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In this connection, child separation in the context of immigration is an
issue that has been hidden and implicates the epistemology of ignorance in
other important ways. Perhaps surprisingly, states have begun "removing
children from undocumented immigrant parents and terminating their
parental rights."'8 8 Normally, the settled law has been that "courts may not
terminate the rights of fit parents."' 8 9 However, in the immigration context,
there has been a "largely unnoticed, change in the law." 90 With respect to
undocumented immigrants, fitness does not constitute a barrier to the
deprivation and elimination of the rights of the parents to the child. 191To the
contrary, "when courts and agencies believe that termination is in a child's
best interests, they will find that a parent's undocumented status alone is
sufficient to demonstrate unfitness."' 19' Usually, three general sorts of
reasons are given to establish that termination of the undocumented
immigrant's parental rights is in the child's best interest: (a) "it is not in the
child's best interest to live in a foreign country"; (2) "life in the United States
provides more opportunities"; and (3) "many of these children have the
opportunity to be adopted by American families."' 193 Thus, the states have
been empowered to "permanently deprive" undocumented immigrant parents
of their children
"separating them indefinitely with little hope of being
194
reunited.'

This brutal trend of terminating the parental rights of undocumented
immigrants implicates the epistemology of ignorance as it surely
the U.S. Immigration Legal System, 46 URB. L.J. 548, 567-68 (2019); see also Licona &
Luibheid, supra note 185, at 45-46 ("The Trump family separation policy builds on a long and

brutal history of separating children from their families and communities. The U.S.
Government has consistently valued and supported white, middle-class, married families as a
means to build the nation. Families that are indigenous, of color, poor, queer, and nonnormative gender have been treated as threats to fear and expel or labor to exploit. The forced
separation of migrant families at the border fits into the United States long history of treating
enslaved families as property whose members can be sold away from one another, forcing
Native American children into boarding schools designed to violently strip away their
language, culture, identity, family and community ties, immigration policies designed to
prevent immigrants of color from settling and forming families; punitive, deeply inadequate
social welfare policies, and domestic policies that punish, impoverish, incarcerate, and destroy
poor, queer, indigenous, and racialized U.S. citizen families in part by cultivating a cradle-toprison pipeline that makes the United States the most incarcerated nation in the world").
188. Marcia Yablon-Zug, Separation,Deportation,Termination, 32 B.C. J. LAw& Soc.
JUST. 1, 4 (2012).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.at4-5.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Sarah Rogerson, Unintended and Unavoidable: The Failure to ProtectRule and
Its Consequencesfor UndocumentedParents and Their Children, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 580, 581
(2012).
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misrepresents and misdescribes what is in the best interests of the child.
"Although these actions are purportedly taken in the best interests of the
children, empirical research shows that children suffer emotional and
psychological harm when they are separated from their parents or placed into
foster care after their parents are detained."' 195 As Yoshikawa and SuarezOrozco have explained:
Research by the Urban Institute and others reveals the deep and
irreversible harm that parental deportation causes in the lives of
their children. Having a parent ripped away permanently, without
warning, is one of the most devastating and traumatic experiences
in human development.... In the long run, the children of
deportation faced increased odds of lasting economic turmoil,
psychic scarring, reduced school attainment, greater difficulty in
96
maintaining relationships, social exclusion and lower earnings. 1
Moreover, in a recent review of the literature examining "the impact of
deportation-related family separations on psychosocial well-being of
children among the Latin[o] population" the authors found:
That the accumulation of psychosocial stressors due to
deportation-related family separation produced significant effects
on children's mental health and well-being. Youth experienced a
range of negative mental
health outcomes including: depression,
97
1
trauma.
and
anxiety
VII.

FEDERALISM IN RECENT SUPREME COURT CASES
AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF IGNORANCE

The notion of "constitutional federalism" involves the idea "of judicial
enforcement of structural limits on federal power, usually for the purpose of
leaving greater scope for state and local authority."' 19 In the era of Chief

195. Id. at 582.

196. Hirokazu Yoshikawa & Carola Suarez-Orozco, Opinion, DeportingParentsHurts
Kids, N.Y. TIMEs (April 20, 2017); see also Rogerson, supra note 194.

197. Kristina Lovato, Corina Lopez, Leyla Karimli & Laura Abrams, The Impact of
DeportationRelated Family Separations on the Well-being of Latinx Children and Youth: A
Review of the Literature,95 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVS. REv., 109, 114 (2018).
198. Illya Somin, Federalism and the Roberts Court, 46 PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF
FEDERALISM, 441, 442 (2016); see also Martin H. Redish, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS
IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 344 (1990) ("The interests of 'federalism,' on the

other hand, 'represent ... a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments,' where the federal govermnent attempts to protect
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Justice John Roberts,' 99 the idea of federalism has become extremely
important. 200 The Roberts Court has recently handed down some major cases
in the area of federalism which illustrate the epistemology of ignorance at
work in the area of race and law. As federal judge Lynn Adelman has
recognized, "[flor African-Americans, particularly those living in the states
of the former confederacy, the impact of the federalist doctrine has been
devastating.... 2 0 1
For instance, in NFIB v. Sebelius, 20 2 the Supreme Court considered the

constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
sometimes also known as "Obamacare." In Sebelius, the Supreme Court
upheld the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate to buy health insurance
as a tax. °3 The Court, however, went on to hold that the Affordable Care
Act's expansion of Medicaid 20 4 which required the states to cover "a new
category of beneficiaries was unconstitutionally coercive because" the
federal government "could theoretically withdraw all ...of federal Medicaid
funding" if the state failed to cover the new beneficiaries, 20namely,
persons
5
with incomes of up to 138 percent above the poverty level.
federal rights 'in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the
States') (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)); see also Charlton C. Copeland,
Beyond Separationin FederalismEnforcement. Medicaid Expansion, Coercion, and the Norm
of Engagement, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 91, 106 (2012) ("Federalism, understood as the
separation of substantive authority of the state and national government, provides the recipe
for the protection of state authority as a constitutional commitment").
199. See Benjamin Pomerance, The Center of Order:ChiefJustice John Roberts and the
Coming Struggle for a Respected Supreme Court, 82 ALB. L. REV. 449 (2019), for a recent
analysis of the role and judicial philosophy of Justice Roberts.
200. See generally, Somin, supra note 198.
201. Lynn Adelman, LaunderingRacism through the Courts, 65 DISSENT, 111, 111
(2018).
202. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
203. Id. at 574; see also Somin, supra note 198, at 446-47 ("[Chief Justice] Roberts
broke with the Court's other four conservatives and upheld the mandate on the basis that it
could be interpreted as a tax authorized by Congress's power to impose taxes. He claimed
that the mandate could be considered a tax because an individual's failure to purchase
insurance (i) triggered a relatively small monetary fine collected by the Internal Revenue
Service, (ii) does not qualify as a crime if the fine is paid, and (iii) does not require a showing
of criminal intent ...").
204. Copeland, supra note 198, at 126 ("Medicaid is often cited as one of the
paradigmatic examples of cooperative federalism in American legislative history. Indeed, it
is not hyperbolic to declare Medicaid as the most significant federal-state program in
American history. Medicaid relies on states to administer programs that provide access to
medical care for the indigent and reimburses state governments for a portion of the costs
incurred.").
205. Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into
Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in NationalFederationof IndependentBusiness
v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2013); see also Copeland, supra note 198, at 95-96 ("The
Court's invalidation of parts of the Medicaid Expansion provision was perhaps the biggest
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In reaching and justifying this conclusion that there was unconstitutional
coercion, the U.S. Supreme Court misdescribed and misrepresented the facts
regarding Medicaid expansion, thus implicating the epistemology of
ignorance. One of the key reasons the Court had for holding that the
Medicaid expansion was unconstitutional coercion against the states was that
the Affordable Care Act "had changed the Medicaid program so dramatically
as to transform it into an entirely new program. '"206 Justice Roberts
explained:
The Medicaid expansion, however, accomplishes a shift in kind,
not merely degree. The original program was designed to cover
medical services for four particular categories of needs: the
disabled, the blind, the elderly, and needy families with dependent
children.... Previous amendments to Medicaid eligibility merely
altered and expanded the boundaries of these categories. Under
the Affordable Care Act, Medicaid is transformed into a program
to meet the healthcare needs of the entire nonelderly population
with income below 133 percent of the poverty level. It is no longer
a program to care for the neediest among us, but rather an element
of a comprehensive national plan to provide universal health
insurance coverage. 207
One of the main reasons the court gave for concluding that the
Affordable Care Act Medicaid expansion was a new program and
unconstitutionally coercive is that the plurality stated that prior Medicaid
expansions did not put existing Medicaid funding at risk but placed
conditions "only [on] the new [Medicaid] funding., 20 8 This constitutes a
misdescription of reality implicating the epistemology of ignorance.
Contrary to the plurality's position, Congress has expanded Medicaid on a
number of occasions. 20 9 With respect to each expansion of Medicaid in 1967,
1972, 1988, and 2003, the states could lose all Medicaid funding if the states

surprise of the otherwise unpredictable decision. By invalidating the ACA's grant of authority
to the Secretary of Health and Human Services to withhold all of a state's federal Medicaid
reimbursement as a penalty for not expanding Medicaid eligibility, the Roberts Court became
the first court to hold a federal spending statute unconstitutionally coercive of state
governments. The extent to which the court has transformed the national-state relationship is
unclear. What is clear is that the Court's position is a sharp break from past precedent and
calls into question the national-state relationship in the administration of one of the central
pillars of cooperative federalism.").
206. Adelman, supra note 201, at 115.
207. 567 U.S. at 583.

208. Id. at 582.
209. Huberfeld et al., supra note 205, at 20-21.
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failed to expand Medicaid coverage. 210 For instance, in 1967, Congress
expanded Medicaid to broaden coverage for children.21' In 1972, Congress
amended Medicaid by creating a federal Supplemental Security Income
("SSI") program which replaced a program for the aged, blind and
disabled.2 12 In 1988, Congress expanded Medicaid coverage by creating
"uniform mandatory eligibility categories up to 133% FPL for pregnant
women and children from birth to age 5, and up to 100% FPL for children
ages six to eighteen. 213 These changes represent a major increase in the
number of people who were covered by Medicaid.214 In 2003, Congress
expanded Medicaid by creating "coverage for outpatient prescription drugs
in the Medicare program. 2 15 Given all of this, Professors Huberfeld,
Leonard and Outterson conclude that "the Roberts plurality was historically
inaccurate when it suggested that prior Medicaid expansions were voluntary
or did not put already existing program funds at risk. 216 Moreover, these
authors conclude that "[t]hese changes have not been mere tinkering but
significant expansion [of Medicaid] in both kind and degree. '"217
Under these circumstances, the Affordable Care Act's expansion of
Medicaid represented not a new program but just another expansion of the
original Medicaid program "by extending coverage to all citizens and legal
residents with incomes up to 133% of the Federal Poverty Level., 2 18 Justice
Roberts argued that the Affordable Care Act represented a different program
in kind "because unlike the pre-ACA Medicaid, the Medicaid expansion
'does not care for the neediest among us."' 2 19 This, however, was a
misrepresentation of reality, raising the spectre of the epistemology of
ignorance. The pre-ACA Medicaid categories of beneficiaries all covered
poor persons-e.g., poor senior citizens and poor disabled persons.
The
category created by the Affordable Care Act also covered poor persons,
namely, poor adults 2 Given this, contrary to Justice Robert's position, the
Affordable Care Act expansion did not represent a new program differing in
kind because "the basic function of Medicaid, both before and after the
expansion, was the same: to provide healthcare to poor people., 222 As
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Huberfeld et al., supra note 205, at 21-24.
Huberfeld et al., supra note 205, at 21-22.
Huberfeld et al., supra note 205, at 22.
Huberfeld et al., supra note 205, at 23.
Id.
Id.
Huberfeld et al., supra note 205, at 24.
Id.
Huberfeld et al., supra note 205, at 25.
Id.at 25 (quoting Nat'l Fed'n ofIndep. Bus. v.Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 635 (2012)).
Huberfeld et al., supra note 205, at 25.
Id.
Adelman, supra note 201.

Summer 2020

LAW, RACE, AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF IGNORANCE

545

Professors Huberfeld, Leonard and Outterson explained:
The Medicaid expansion was significant.
But on closer
examination, it was just another step in another step in a regular
process of incrementalist modification to the existing program,
akin to prior amendments over the past half century. Each of the
prior coverage expansions, redefinitions of eligibility, and funding
adjustments have changed the terms of the cooperative
arrangement between the federal government and participating
states. The ACA's Medicaid amendments were no more dramatic
than these earlier changes. The Court's claim that the expansion
was an entirely new program does not square with the historical
record.223
Since the Court decided that the Medicaid expansion was
unconstitutional coercion, it had to devise a remedy. Instead of holding the
entire Affordable Care Act unconstitutional, the Court simply made the
Medicaid expansion optional for the state S.224
The operation of the epistemology of ignorance regarding the
Affordable Care Act Medicaid expansion has resulted in the subordination
and oppression of African-Americans. The NFIB ruling making Medicaid
expansion optional for the states resulted in almost every southern state
opting out of the Affordable Care Act Medicaid expansion.225 In declining
to participate in the Medicaid expansion, these states "severely restrict[ed]
social-service benefits to their poorest citizens, most of whom are AfricanAmericans., 226 Moreover, as Stephen Griffin has observed this "southern
failure" in the wake of the Sebelius decision was "both predictable and very
unfortunate in terms of its impact on health outcomes for all the poor in the
southern states, but especially for racial minorities. "227
The Sebelius court had in the record a report by the Kaiser Family
Foundation which showed that the southern states had "extremely restrictive
223. Huberfeld et al., supra note 205, at 29.

224. Huberfeld et al., supra note 205, at 40.
225. Adelman, supra note 201; see also Somin, supra note 198, at 447 ("Nonetheless,
this part of the decision turned out to be enormously consequential. As of early 2016, nineteen
Republican-controlled state governments have rejected the Medicaid expansion, including
such major states as Texas and Florida .... This development affects medical care for millions
of people and redirects many billions of dollars of government spending. The Court's
invalidation of the ACA's mandatory Medicaid expansion is probably the most important
ruling invalidating a federal statute on federalism grounds since the New Deal").
226. Adelman, supra note 201.
227. Stephen Griffin, The Tragedy of the MedicaidExpansion (PartII), BALKINIZATION
(Mar. 4,

part.html.

2017),

https://balkin.blogspot.com/20 17/03/the-tragedy-of-medicaid-expansion-
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Medicaid eligibility standards" reflecting a history of racial discrimination
dating from the era of slavery that "severely restrict[ed] social service
benefits to their poorest citizens, most of whom are African-American. "228
"Medicaid 'has greatly increased access to healthcare and has significantly
improved the health outcomes of low-income Americans by virtually every
conceivable measure-including infant mortality, maternal mortality,
disease incidence and life expectancy. '"229 Thus, the failure to expand
Medicaid, resulting in part from misdescriptions and misrepresentations of
reality in Sebelius as predicted by the epistemology of ignorance, will result
in the "suffering and premature deaths of millions of citizens, many of them
poor African-Americans. 2 3 o
231
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Shelby County v. Holder
provides another example of the epistemology of ignorance operating in the
context of federalism and reinforcing the subordination of racial minorities.
In Shelby County, the Supreme Court overturned a significant portion of
Voting Rights Act of 1965. Congress promulgated the Voters Rights Act as
part of its effort to carry out the Fifteenth Amendment's 232 outlawing of
discrimination on the basis of race in the area of voting.2 33 In this regard,
Section 5 of the Voters Rights Act required certain states to obtain approval
from federal officials-the U.S. attorney general or the federal district court
in Washington, D.C.-before changing their laws dealing with voting.234 The
228. Adelman, supra note 201.
229. Griffin, supra note 227 (quoting SHANNA ROSE, FINANCING MEDICAID:
FEDERALISM AND THE GROWTH OF AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET (2013)).
230. Mark A. Hall, States' Decisions Not to Expand Medicaid, 92 N.C. L. REv. 1459,

1477 (2014).
231. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
232. The Fifteenth Amendment was one of three constitutional amendments that
Congress enacted "at the close of the Civil War" for the purpose of "preventing 'Southerners
from re-establishing white supremacy. "' Adam Bolotin, Out of Touch: Shelby County v.
Holder and the Callous Effects of Chief Justice Roberts Equal State Sovereignty, 49 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 751, 753 (2016).

233. 570 U.S. at 536-37. "In an effort to remediate the recurring problem of racial
discrimination in voting against blacks, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Voting Rights
Act into law on August 6, 1965. As stated by President Johnson, the Act was 'a triumph for
freedom as huge as any victory that has ever been won on any battlefield. "' Ashley M. White,
The Demolition of the Voting Rights Act. The Combat to Overcome Voter Suppression of
DisenlranchisedCitizens Shelby County v. Holder, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 193, 200
(2015).
234. See Paul F. Hancock & Lora L. Tredway, The Bailout Standardof the Voting Rights
Act. An Incentive to End Discrimination, 17 URB. LAW. 379, 386 (1985) (in order to make

sure "that states and counties did not implement new methods of racial discrimination in
voting... Congress... adopted the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Act, requiring
each targeted or 'covered' jurisdiction, if it wished to implement a voting standard, practice or
procedure" to secure approval from "the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia" or "the attorney general of the United States").
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States would then have to establish that the proposed changes did not prevent
or limit the right to vote on grounds of race.235 In Shelby County, the Supreme
Court invalidated as unconstitutional Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act
which sets out the coverage formula for the preclearance requirement in
Section 5 of the Voter's Rights Act. The Court held that the coverage formula
was unconstitutional because it violated the "fundamental principle of equal
sovereignty among the states" in as much as it was not "grounded in current
conditions" or 236
'justified by current needs" and was instead "based on 40year-old data.,

The court's decision in Shelby County provides another example of the
epistemology of ignorance as the court, in substance, actively produced
ignorance as to whether there was a current need for the preclearance
requirement. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsberg set out the current
facts or conditions that continued to justify the need for the preclearance
requirement: (1) states "continued to submit, in large numbers, proposed
changes to voting laws that the Attorney General declined to approve,
auguring that barriers to minority voting would quickly resurface were the
preclearance remedy eliminated; (2) even though there were increasing
numbers of minorities registering to vote and voting, "other measures may
be resorted to which would dilute increasing minority voting strength"; (3)
Congress compiled an extensive 15,000 page record containing "countless
,examples of flagrant racial discrimination' since the last reauthorization...
[including] systematic evidence that 'intentional racial discrimination in
voting remains so serious and widespread in covered jurisdictions that
Section 5 preclearance is still needed.' 237 Thus, the Court "ignored the
extensive legislative record compiled by Congress establishing the
persistence of voting discrimination in the covered jurisdictions."238
Given the demonstrated continuing need for preclearance, it was

235. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.

236. 570 U.S. at 542, 544, 556-557. "These categorical judgments suggest the view that
racial discrimination in voting is naturally isolated in time and scope. The majority's analysis
forecloses the possibility that the historical discrimination in the covered jurisdictions involved
particular institutions designed to produce long term unlawful political power, such as
especially racially identified and racially polarized political party structure." Martha T.
McCluskey, Toward A Fundamental Right to Evade Law? The Rule of Power in Shelby
County andState Farm, 17 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 216, 221 (2015).
237. 570 U.S. at 565. See also McCluskey, supra note 236, at 222 ("In fact, Ginsberg's

dissent noted Congress considered evidence in 2006 showing an increase in voting changes in
the colored jurisdictions deemed objectionable because of racial discrimination in the period
from 1982 to 2004 compared with the earlier period of enforcement from 1965 to 1982").
238. Adelman, supra note 201; see also Angelica Rolong, 46 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 519,
547 (2014) ("The majority in Shelby County failed to see the copious amount of evidence
gathered by Congress and ignored the purpose of the movement that led to the passage of the
[Voting Rights Amendment]").
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reasonably foreseeable that southern states would enact laws intended to limit
the vote of racial minorities. For example, shortly after the Shelby County
decision, "the North Carolina State Legislature passed a 'monster voter
suppression law that required strict photo ID, cut early voting and eliminated
same day registration and pre-registration for 16 and 17 year olds.'- 239 The
law "'excluded many of the alternative photo IDs used by African
Americans"' and "retained only the kinds of IDs that white North Carolinians
were more likely to possess."' Indeed, the Fourth Circuit bluntly states "that
the law targeted African Americans 'with almost surgical precision. '"240
Similarly, shortly after the Shelby County ruling, "Texas announced that its
previously blocked discriminatory voting laws would immediately go into
effect.' '24 1 Indeed, since the Supreme Court's decision, fourteen states have
passed laws limiting voting which might not have satisfied the preclearance
requirements if Section 5 had been upheld.242 In other words, the Shelby
County "decision opened the floodgates, enabling states ... with the most
egregious histories of discriminating against the voting rights of minorities
to start discriminating all over again: and thereby "do great harm to the voting
rights of African-Americans in the South.... 24 3
Given the extremely negative results for racial minorities resulting from
the judicial enforcement of federalism in Sebelius and Shelby County, these
decisions powerfully support the general view that "federalism is a disaster
for racial and ethnic minority groups., 244 The epistemology of ignorance has
aided the use of federalism to subordinate persons of color.

239. Matthew Murillo, Did Voter Suppression Win President Trump the Election?: The
Decimation of the VotingRightsAct and the Importance of Section 5, 51 U.S.F. L. REv. 591,
606-07 (2017).
240. N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214-215 (4th Cir. 2016).
241. Adelman, supra note 201.
242. Murillo, supra note 239, at 607-08.
243. Adelman, supra note 201; see also Rolong, supra note 238, at 559 ("The Supreme
Court's decision in Shelby County will create consequences for Texas voters, as well as voters
in other formerly covered jurisdictions. As a result of this decision, minority voters should
expect to see the imposition of more second-generation barriers, especially on local levels
where there is little oversight").
244. Ilya Somin, Making Federalism Great Again: How the Trump Administration's
Attack on Sanctuary Cities Unintentionally Strengthened Judicial Protection for State
Autonomy, 97 TEx. L. REV. 1247, 1291 (2019); see also McCluskey, supra note 235, at 228
("Shelby County may herald.., a revival of an older constitutional ideal assuming that law's
protection normally and naturally must lead to accommodate the weight of unequal economic
and racial power").
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LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, THE OUTLAWING OF
ETHNIC STUDIES IN ARIZONA, AND THE
EPISTEMOLOGY OF IGNORANCE

Another way in which the epistemology of ignorance is implicated in
law is in the area of legal scholarship. In particular, ignorance has been
produced in the area of law through the exclusion or marginalization of racial
minorities in the context of legal scholarship. In a now famous article,
Richard Delgado found that "white scholars" had engaged in "systematic
occupation of, and exclusion of, minority scholars from the central areas of
civil rights scholarship. 245 This exclusion resulted in certain defects,
including defects in knowledge.24 6 For instance white scholars "were
unaware of basic facts about the situation in which minority persons live or
ways in which they see the world. 24 7 Delgado found that "the exclusion of
minority writing about key issues of race law.., causes bluntings, skewings
and omissions in the literature dealing with race, racism and American
law. 248 In a follow-up article, written about ten years later, Delgado found
that minority authors "are still not being integrated fully or equally into the
colloquies, exchange, and dialogues of legal scholarship., 249 He concluded
that "imperial scholarship will continue to be with us a long time. "250 Indeed,
Professor Juan Perea has recently confirmed Delgado's prediction:
Thirty years after he wrote his first Imperial Scholar article, the
situation is pretty much unchanged since Richard wrote the
Imperial Scholar Revisited. There are certainly more scholars of
color in academia today, publishing and adding to our wealth of
knowledge. Yet in the main writings on race remain marginalized.
The knowledge we have produced has neither been integrated into
245.

Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561, 566 (1984)

(Leading critical race theorist Professor Derrick Bell has called this Imperial Scholar article
-'an intellectual hand grenade, tossed over the wall of the establishment as a form of academic
protest. "'). Juan F. Perea, Of Word Grenades and Impermeable Walls: Imperial Scholarship
Then and Now, 33 LAW & INEQ. 443, 447 (2015) (quoting Jon Wiener, Law Profs Fightthe
Power, NATION, Sept. 1989 at 246 (quoting Derrick Bell); see also Robert S. Chang, Richard
Delgado and the Politics of Citation, 11 BERKLEY J. AFR. AM. L. & POL'Y 28 (2009) ("[The

Imperial Scholar article] created a firestorm of sorts with what one critic called a 'serious
charge of invidious racism on the part of respected legal scholars').
246. Delgado, supra note 245, at 566-73.
247. Id. at 567-68.
248. Id. at 573; see also Chang, supra note 245, at 30-31 (The "exclusion of minority
scholars" leads to the "distortion of legal knowledge and limited vision of justice").
249. Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited. How to Marginalize Outsider
Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1349, 1372 (1992).
250. Id. at 1372.
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the canon, nor has it had its proper influence in the realms of
today's imperial scholars. 1
This production of ignorance in the context of legal scholarship has
resulted in the subordination of racial minorities because it leads to
ineffective advocacy of the rights and interests of racial minorities and sets
up barriers to advancement of racial minorities in the legal academy in terms
of obtaining tenure and promotion. 2
Similarly, the dominant group also has actively sought to produce
ignorance in seeking to outlaw ethnic studies 253 in Arizona. The Tucson

Arizona Unified School District established a program of Mexican-American
Studies in 1998.254

This Mexican-American studies program was very

successful and produced high academic achievement for Latino students who
participated in the program. 5 Indeed, these Latino students "surpassed all

other students on the state's graduation exam and graduated at a higher rate
than their Anglo peers" and "enrolled in college at a percentage that is 129
times greater than the national average for Chicano/a students., 256 This
program developed knowledge based on "the Chicano/Latino Voice,
experience, perspective, and history. 257
Led by the Arizona State
Superintendent of Instruction, Tom Home, who claimed that the MexicanAmerican studies program "promoted the separation of the races, ethnic
solidarity, hatred of whites, and the overthrow of the U.S. government," the

251. Perea, supranote 245, at 447.
252. See Chang, supra note 245, at 30-34.

253. "The Ethnic Studies movement constituted a broad effort to challenge the
constricted disciplinary perspectives that have historically defined the Western academy. The
appearance of a multitude of subaltern standpoints from which new knowledges, histories, and
political futurities were being generated threw into question the boundaries and procedures
that had worked to contain, discipline, and legitimize the Western sciences." Alex J. Armonda,
Advancing an (Im)possibleAlternative: Ethnic Studies in NeoliberalTimes, 7 TEx. EDUC. REV.
30, 31 (2019).
254. See Lupe S. Salinas, Arizona's Desire to Eliminate Ethnic Studies Programs: A
Time to Take the "Pill" and Engage Latino Students in Critical Education About Their

History, 14 HARv.LATINO L. REv. 301, 305 (2011). The Mexican-American Studies Program
was developed as a result of litigation brought to desegregate the Tucson Unified School
District. M. Isabel Medina, Silencing Talk About Race: Why Arizona's Prohibitionof Ethnic
Studies Violates Equality, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 47, 67-72 (2017).
255. Salinas, supranote 254, at 301-302.
256. Salinas, supranote 254, at 302.
257. Salinas, supra note 254, at 301-302; see also Armonda, supra note 253, at 31
C[W]e must frame the push for Ethnic Studies as but one important expression of a broader
effort to challenge the coloniality of the academy and academic knowledge as such. This is a
project that aims to disrupt the ontologies, epistemologies, and dominant ideologies that are
positioned in schools as neutral, objective, ahistorical, or atheoretical[.]").
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Arizona legislature enacted H.R. 2281 outlawing ethnic studies. 258 The
statute provided: "The legislature finds and declares that public school pupils
should be taught to treat and value each other as individuals and not be taught
to resent or hate other races or classes of people. '259 The statute further
provided:
A school district or charter school in this state shall not
include in its program of instruction any course or classes
that:
(1) Promote the overthrow of the United States
government.
(2) Promote resentment toward a race or class of people.
(3) Are designed primarily for pupils of a particular
ethnic group.
(4) Advocate ethnic solidarity instead of the treatment
of pupils as individuals.260
Finally, the statute provided a penalty for districts that refused to comply
with the requirements of the anti-ethnic studies statute in that ten percent of
the monthly apportionment of state aid to the district would be withheld.26 1
H.B. 2281 was designed to outlaw Mexican-American studies in Arizona.262
Following the enactment of the statute, Superintendent Tom Home
announced that the Tucson Mexican-American studies program failed to
comply with the statutory requirements.263 In response to the Superintendent,
the Tucson school board ordered the teachers in• ,264
the Mexican-American
studies program "to shift to other subjects or resign.
The authorities also
confiscated "textbooks and other materials" which were used in the program

258.
259.
260.
261.

Salinas, supranote 254, at 304.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-111.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-112(A).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-112(B).

262. See Richard Delgado, Precious Knowledge: State Bans on Ethnic Studies, Book
Traffickers (Librotraficantes), and a New Type of Race Trial, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1513, 1522

(2013); see also Jessica A. Solyom & Bryan McKinley Jones Brayboy, Memento Mori:
Policing the Minds and Bodies of Indigenous Latinaslos in Arizona, 42 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.

473, 478 (2012) ("Arizona House Bill 2281, signed into law on May 11, 2010, is legislation
intended to target racialized citizens and legal residents" and was "created to specifically target
the Mexican-American Raza Studies Program in the Tucson Unified School District[.]").
263. Delgado, supra note 262, at 1523; See also Kevin Terry, Community Dreams and
Nightmares. Arizona, Ethnic Studies andthe ContinuedRelevance of DerrickBell's InterestConvergence Thesis, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1483, 1500 (2013) ("In December of 2010, Home

issued findings that the TUSD's Program violated [H.B. 2281] because the program was
'designed primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic group"').
264. Delgado, supra note 262, at 1523.
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"in front of crying students. 265
Obviously, outlawing ethnic studies
programs which were developing knowledge based on the MexicanAmenican experience, is an example of the dominant group actively
producing ignorance and suppressing knowledge as predicted by the
epistemology of ignorance theorists. This suppression of knowledge and
production of ignorance in the context of ethnic studies has enabled the
subordination of racial minorities by "imped[ing] the academic and economic
success" of people of color in an effort to "protect the economic and powerful
266
interest of whites."
IX.

CONCLUSION

In this article, I have sought to reveal-through a series of important
examples-how the dominant group has constructed an epistemology of
ignorance in the area of race and the law. This epistemology of ignorance
requires the dominant group-in order to maintain their socially dominant
position-to "engage in a significant degree of misunderstanding,
misinterpretation and misrepresentation on matters related to race., 267 In
particular, I have argued that the dominant group has constructed an
epistemology of ignorance (1) in the area of law with respect to Native
Americans; (2) in the area of law with respect to Mexican-Americans; (3) in
the area of employment discrimination law; (4) in the area of immigration
law and policy in the Trump era; (5) in the area of federalism in recent United
States Supreme Court cases; and (6) in the areas of legal scholarship and in
the outlawing of ethnic studies in Arizona. I also have argued that this
production of ignorance has helped enable whites to maintain their socially
dominant position in American society.

265. Id.
266. Solyom & Brayboy, supra note 262, at 502.
267. Mason, supra note 7, at 302.

